Sensitivity to sentiment: News vs social media by Gan, B et al.
Elsevier required licence: © <2019>. 




The definitive publisher version is available online at  
 
https://www.journals.elsevier.com/international-review-of-financial-analysis 
Sensitivity to Sentiment: News vs Social Media∗
Baoqing Gan],†, Vitali Alexeev] ,‡ , Ron Bird\ , Danny Yeung],
] Finance Department, UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney
Sydney, New South Wales 2007, Australia
‡ Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Ontario N1G2W1, Canada
\ Waikato Management School, University of Waikato, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand
September 13, 2019
Abstract
We explore the rapidly changing social and news media landscape that is responsible for
the dissemination of information vital to the efficient functioning of the financial markets.
Using the sheer volume of social and news media activity, commonly known as buzz, we doc-
ument three distinct regimes. We find that between 2011 and 2013 the news media coverage
stimulates activity in social media. This is followed by a transition period of two-way causal-
ity. From 2016, however, changes in levels of social media activity seem to lead and generate
news coverage volumes. We uncover similar evolution of lead-lag pattern between sentiment
measures constructed from the tonality contained in textual data from social and news media
posts. We discover that market variables exert stronger impact on investor sentiment than
the other way around. We also find that return responses to social media sentiment almost
doubled after the transition period, while return responses to news-based sentiment almost
halved to its pre-transition level. The linkage between volatility and sentiment is much more
persistent than that between returns and sentiment. Overall, our results suggest that social
media is becoming the dominant media source.
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“Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail. With-
out it, nothing can succeed.”
—Abraham Lincoln
1 Introduction
The financial sentiment literature has shown that macroeconomic announcements, major geopo-
litical events, and corporate announcements change investors’ sentiment and often influence stock
prices. Traditionally, investors receive this information through mainstream financial news re-
ports, official announcements, corporate conference calls, and analysts research reports. Recent
advancements in digital and telecommunication technologies facilitated social media platforms
such as Twitter and StockTwits in becoming an instant channel for stock information sharing1,
disseminating greater quantities of company related information to the market at faster speeds.
The importance of social media in the information dissemination process has been recognized by
both regulators and market participants. For example, Bloomberg announced that it would add
Twitter accounts to its financial information terminals - a “must-be” tool used by traders on Wall
Street.2 For its part, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a guidance in
2008 admitting that corporate websites can serve as an effective means for disseminating infor-
mation to investors, the SEC pointed out in its investigation report toward Netflix that “company
communications made through social media channels could constitute selective disclosures and,
therefore, require careful Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) analysis”. Then in June 2015, the
SEC further announced that “a start-up firm can post Twitter message about its stock or debt
offering to gauge interest among potential investors” (Bartov et al., 2018), marking, for the first
time, its official acceptance of social media as information dissemination channel.
Classical asset pricing models assume that investors mutually influence each other only
through market price mechanisms. This assumption is less realistic since it overlooks the social
interactions between investors. In reality, investors communicate and learn information through
a combination of news media and social media, making social influence a critical factor of the
information dissemination process and asset pricing (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009). Social media
has been known to create attention-grabbing hot topic that may sway investors’ beliefs about
company’s future outlook, thus forming investor sentiment that ultimately affects stock prices.
For example, on 23 April 2013, a fake tweet from official Twitter account of the Associate Press
announced that President Obama was injured in two explosions in the White House.3 According
to Washington Post, this hacked tweet was retweeted 4,000 times in less than five minutes with
its nearly 2 million followers. Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) dropped 143.5 points within
2 minutes, temporarily losing an estimated US$136 billion in value. This incident triggered cri-
tiques that the financial industry may have relied too heavily upon trading algorithms that are
based on social media content.
In this paper, we explore this rapidly changing social and news media landscape that is
responsible for the dissemination of information so vital to the efficient functioning of the financial
markets. First, we explore the evolving relationship between social media and news media from
1Stafford, P. (2015), ’Traders and investors use Twitter to get ahead of market moves’, FINAN-
CIAL TIMES, April 29, accessed 12 August 2018, <https://www.google.com.au/amp/s/amp.ft.com/content/
c464d944-ee75-11e4-98f9-00144feab7de>.
2Alden, W. (2013), ’Twitter arrives on the Wall Street, via Bloomberg’, The New York Times, April 4, accessed 12
August 2018, <https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/twitter-arrives-on-wall-street-via-bloomberg/>.
3Fisher, M. (2013), ’Syrian hackers claim AP hack that tipped stock market by $136 billion. Is it terrorism?’ The




2011 to 2017. Using the sheer volume of social/news media activity, commonly known as buzz, we
documented three distinct regimes. We find that between 2011 and 2013 the news media coverage
stimulates activity in social media. This is followed by transition period where news and social
media activities tend to intertwine. From 2016, however, changes in quantities of social media
activity seem to lead and generate news coverage volumes. We find a similar evolving pattern
of lead-lag relationship between sentiment measures constructed from the tonality contained in
textual data from social and news media posts.
Secondly, given that social media played a more prominent role after 2016 while news media
used to be predominant before 2014, we set out to investigate the dynamic in the relationship
between media activities and the stock market before and after this transition. In particular, we
are interested in how news and social media sentiment affects stock returns and volatility in the
periods from 2011 to 2013 and from 2016 to 2017. In dealing with inevitable endogeneity issue in
the analysis of this kind, we account for the reverse influence from the stock market on social and
news media. Facilitated by restricted bivariate VAR models that contain a media variable and
a market variable, we find that the reaction of media sentiment to stock market shocks is more
pronounced than the sensitivity of return/volatility to changes from media sentiment. This result
is in line with Sprenger et al. (2014b) and Araújo et al. (2018), which find that the market features
(return, trading volume and volatility) have stronger effects on media features (bullishness and
posting volumes). The analysis of impulse response functions from models in the two separate
periods identified above reveals that the speed of reactions for both return and sentiment have
accelerated after 2016 compared to the period before 2014. Return responses to social media
sentiment almost doubled after the transition period (from 0.03 to 0.07), while return responses
to changes in news-based sentiment almost halved to its pre-transition level (from 0.030 to 0.016).
These results corroborate our prior findings that social media is more prevalent after 2016. In
contrast to return and media sentiment interactions, we find that volatility in both pre-transition
and post-transition periods display higher sensitivity to social media sentiment than to news-
based sentiment. Stock volatility reactions to shocks from media sentiment are more persistent
than return responses. We conclude that the media sentiment does not follow market activity
passively, but is actively engaging in shaping the market movements under different information
environments.
Our contribution is threefold. Firstly, by separating social and traditional news media, we
obtain insights into the time-varying relationship between the two information channels. As
a result of the advancement in information and telecommunication technology, as well as the
acceptance of the new technology by regulatory authorities, we observe propagation of social
media in the later sample periods. Our results suggest that researchers in this topic should and
must consider the time-varying nature of the social/news media interplay. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no other research that highlights such differences, and details sentiment effects
on stock market from different media sources. Secondly, accounting for the bilateral causality
between media sentiment and stock market variations, we provide empirical evidence to the
expanding literature on investor sentiment and noise trader risk (De Long et al., 1990). Unlike
previous work, we use sentiment measures based on textual analysis that synthesizes multiple
media channels’ information, rather than focusing on a single platform. Lastly, our detailed
statistical analysis of the Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices (TRMI) data adds value to the
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validity of textual data in asset pricing applications by shedding light on how information from
various media sources is incorporated into stock prices and volatility.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews previous work on investor senti-
ment, Section 3 describes sample data, elucidates the data pre-processing approach, and discusses
research methodology, Section 4 reports results on the news and social media interplay over time,
Section 5 analyses causal effects between media sentiment and stock market return/volatility.
We conclude in Section 6 and propose directions for future research.
2 Literature Review
Information have played a central role in investors’ choices since the advent of financial markets.
Traditionally, the news media played a dominant role. For example, Tetlock (2007) shows that
the content of the influential Wall Street Journal, and in particular its tone, can influence the
volume of market trading and returns. Stories about a company are so important that the
absence of news coverage could impact stock prices. Chan (2003) shows that companies that had
no news stories experience reversals in prices in the following month. With the advancement in
technology and the rise of social media, the news media is no longer the sole source of information
in general and, in particular, for investors. Kwak et al. (2010) examined 106 million tweets and
found that 85% of the tweets were news related. In the field of finance, studies have shown
that postings on internet message boards (see Wysocki (1998), Antweiler and Frank (2004), Das
and Chen (2007), and Chen et al. (2014)), and on other social media platforms such as Twitter
and StockTwits (e.g., Sprenger et al. (2014a), Ranco et al. (2015)) can exert influences on stock
prices and volatility. The question is whether social media have changed the way that investors
consume news.
This is, literally, a billion-dollar question as social media can be subject to manipulation. For
example, Lee et al. (2015) found that management use social media to mitigate the negative
stock price impact of bad news about a company such as product recall. This strategy is partic-
ularly effective because it is not only the content but the tone of the message that can generate
sentiment, which can influence the investor reactions to company’s announcement.
Investor sentiment is the prevailing attitude of investors as to anticipated price development.
It is the accumulation of variety of fundamental factors and technical indicators, such as price
history, ratings and reviews, economic news reports, national and world events. According to
Baker and Wurgler (2007), investor sentiment is defined as “a belief about future cash flows that
is not justified by facts at hand”. Broadly, investor sentiment studies can be categorised by the
sentiment measure they employ: measures based on fundamental market variables, sentiment
extracted from various textual sources, and sentiment scores provided by proprietary vendors
such as Thomson Reuters MarketPsych and RavenPack.4
4There are categories of studies that we omit here for brevity, but nevertheless, presenting interesting directions, namely
studies based on internet search behaviour, and studies relying on non-economic factors, such as weather and health
conditions affecting investors’ risk aversion and trading behaviour.
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Investor Sentiment and Stock Market
Early research on investor sentiment and stock market movements are generally based on sen-
timent created from market fundamental variables (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007). These
sentiment proxies allowed to test behavioural finance theories such as security market under-
and overreactions.5 Empirical research on this topic makes three assumptions. First, two groups
of investors play together in the market: irrational noise traders and rational arbitragers. Sec-
ond: noise traders’ sentiment-driven characteristics create risks to their counterparts to bet
against them, which demotivate the arbitragers’ trading behaviour during high sentiment pe-
riods (De Long et al., 1990). Third: there are costs to arbitrage, e.g. limit to short-sale and
capital constraint (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Market microstructure literature assists in tying investor sentiment to market volatility by
dissecting the trading frictions, or bid-ask spread, into different components. Depending on
which component is dominant, there are two mechanisms prescribing the relationship between
sentiment and market volatility. First, investor sentiment negatively impacts on bid-ask spread
and trading price volatility. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) proposes that adverse selection costs,
as part of the bid-ask spread, are negatively correlated with sentiment-driven noise trading. In
strong emotional periods, more noise trading results in narrower bid-ask spread, which concerns
trading costs and risks, and price volatility. Second, investor sentiment positively influences
bid-ask spread and price volatility. Order processing costs and inventory costs, taking a larger
component of bid-ask spread than the adverse selection component (Huang and Stoll, 1997),
are proved to be positively related to price risks and the opportunity cost of holding securities
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Such risk is shown to be positively linked with investor sentiment
as it is harder to evaluate the misvaluations during high sentiment periods (De Long et al., 1990).
Empirical studies applying fundamental variable based sentiment index to examine stock price
movement include: De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Brown and Cliff (2004), Baker and Wurgler
(2006), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Barber and Odean (2007), Karlsson et al. (2009), Canbaş and
Kandır (2009), Stambaugh et al. (2012), and Sayim and Rahman (2015). Findings from these
studies, however, are mixed. For example, Brown and Cliff (2004) and Oliveira et al. (2013) find
little or no predictability to short-term stock returns from investor sentiment, while others reveal
evidence supporting the short-term price deviations as demonstrated by behavioural models.
If such short-term deviations exist, fundamental variable based sentiment indices, constructed
at most monthly, may be too aggregated. More granular sentiment data at higher frequencies
can be derived from other sources, providing a more detailed account of short-term fluctuations.
Investor Sentiment Based on Textual Analysis
In recent decades, advancements in textual analysis and machine learning techniques had shifted
the focus of investor sentiment literature to the analysis of the relationship between stock market
and information quantity, as well as sentiment conveyed within textual data (see Tetlock, 2007;
5Such “behaviour augmented” models usually consider various investor heuristic bias, for example, overconfidence and
self-attribution bias (Daniel et al., 1998), conservatism and representativeness (Barberis et al., 1998), and confirmation bias
(Rabin and Schrag, 1999)). Other behavioural models that focus on investor attention (Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean,
2007; Karlsson et al., 2009) or account for the interactions between different types of investors (Hong and Stein, 1999) have
also been widely applied.
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Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011b). Empirical research relying on scanning
and scoring texts from filed documents and press releases is abundant and still expanding. There
are four main information sources examined by research: corporate filings (e.g., Loughran
and McDonald, 2011a; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013), professional financial news releases (e.g.,
Antweiler and Frank, 2006; Engelberg, 2008; Fang and Peress, 2009; Engelberg et al., 2012;
Garcia, 2013), internet message boards such as Yahoo!Finance, RatingBull and SeekingAlpha
(see Wysocki, 1998; Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Das and Chen, 2007; Chen et al., 2014), and
social media platforms such as Twitter and StockTwits (e.g., Sprenger et al., 2014b; Ranco
et al., 2015), Google search volume (e.g., Da et al., 2011) and Facebook’s Gross National Happiness
index (Siganos et al., 2014).6
Most of the empirical work focuses on either the volume (e.g., coverage) or the sentiment
(positive vs negative emotions or tonality) conveyed in textual data, research that considers
both is rarely observed. In fact, as pointed out by Liu and McConnell (2013), both the level of
media attention and the tones within press articles are significantly associated with the various
types of corporate events, which ultimately impact stock prices and volatility. We adhere to
this view and conduct our analysis accounting for both the level of coverage and the sentiment
tonality expressed by media outlets.
Due to the limited computational power at early stages of textual analysis and the requirement
of manually-handled “training” process for algorithms such as Naive Bayesian Classification,
sample sizes in some of the earlier works are relatively small. One could only focus on either a
small group of representative companies, or constrain the sampling period to a short time frame,
but not both.7 This small sample problem is better dealt with in Leung and Ton (2015) and
Renault (2017). Covering more than 2,000 public firms in Australia from 2003 to 2008, Leung
and Ton (2015) examines over 2.5 million stock related messages posted on HotCopper forum,
and finds that small, high growth, and hard-to-valuation stocks tend to be easily affected by
internet message board. Renault (2017) abstracts textual sentiment from 750,000 StockTwits at
intra-day level between September 2014 and April 2015 and finds that sentiment changes in the
first-half trading hour manifest market return predictability to the last half-hour.
Investor Sentiment Based on MarketPsych Indices
To break the confinements of data availability from small number of assets, short observation
period, and single type of media source, several studies reap the reward of unique data set from
professional financial data vendors such as Thomson Reuters and Dow Jones. This type of data
takes advantage of combining more comprehensive content for certain categories of information
(news or social media), rather than focusing on a standalone platform. For instance, using
sentiment indicators from Thomson Reuters News Scope (TRNS) and texts data from Thomson
Reuters News Archive (TRNA), Heston and Sinha (2017) validates the effectiveness of textual
sentiment data to predict stock returns. They provide evidence that daily textual sentiment
only predict return at short-term (one or two days) horizon, whereas weekly sentiment indices
6Our review of empirical research that utilize various textual data sources in this field is far from exhaustive. For
comprehensive survey, refer to Kearney and Liu (2014) and Brzeszczyński et al. (2015).
7For example, Ranco et al. (2015) uses Twitter API to analyse 30 Dow Jones companies involving 151 events and
covering the period from June 2013 to September 2014, while Das and Chen (2007) examines 24 high-tech companies in
the two-months period from July to August 2011.
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contains predictability up to a quarter.
Different from News Analytic data, Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices (TRMI), the
dataset employed in this paper, contains synthesized quantities and emotional measures from a
wide range of traditional news channels as well as social media platforms.8 We contrast sentiment
captured by TRMI from social and news media to the Baker & Wurgler index (BW) commonly
used in investor sentiment analysis.9 The correlations between social and news media TRMIs and
the BW index are 0.54 and 0.44 respectively, demonstrating a degree of commonality between
TRMI sentiment indicators and the BW index.10 Yet, the magnitudes of correlation coefficients
are indicative of divergence of these two measures, suggesting that the TRMI sentiment indices
capture different investor sentiment from BW. On one hand, strong positive correlation provides
merit for using TRMI as it captures commonality in general trend of these two indicators. On the
other hand, TRMI provides sentiment scores at a much higher frequencies allowing us to study
the dynamics in temporal displacement within sentiment scores (news vs social) and between
sentiment and market variables (sentiment vs returns and/or volatility).
Recent studies have already shown the effectiveness and validity of this dataset in mea-
suring media-related investor sentiment. For example, Michaelides et al. (2015) (see Table 5
therein) matches the manually collected sovereign downgrade news events with TRMI metrics,
and confirms the consistency and validity of TRMI variables. A further research conducted by
Michaelides et al. (2018) uses TRMI and manually constructed FX currency related news to
control for media based public information, confirming consistency between these two groups of
measures. Investigating the market dynamics between TRMI sentiment index and Brazil stock
index (IBovespa), Araújo et al. (2018) finds strong reverse causation from market movements to
media sentiment.
Our paper is complimentary to Sun et al. (2016), Nooijen and Broda (2016), and Jiao and
Walther (2016) in that we focus on the aggregate US equity market. Concentrating on intraday
(half-hour) data from TRMI, Sun et al. (2016) explores the within day return predictability for
the Index. They substantiate that changes of TRMI sentiment in the first half trading hour
are helpful to forecast the last two trading hours’ stock index returns, which is different from
within day momentum effect. They point out that this predictability enables to create economic
value when evaluated with market-timing strategy. Examining the MSCI US Equity Sector
Indices from TRMI, Nooijen and Broda (2016) finds higher predictability for stock volatility
than for return. They highlight the significance of distinguishing different market environments,
for example, calm or volatile periods. Contrasting social media with news using TRMI media
quantity measures, Jiao and Walther (2016) develops a generalised asset pricing model that
accommodates various behavioural biases. They use this model to examine social and news
media effects on volatility and volume of 2,613 US stocks from 2009 to 2014. They document
evidence that higher social media sentiment leads to higher volatility and trading volume in the
next months. In contrast, improvements in news sentiment result in decreased volatility and
volume in the coming month.
8While description of the sub-sample employed in this paper is presented in Section 3, the detailed summary of the full
dataset is provided in the supplementary online appendix.
9We are grateful to Jeffrey Wurgler for making their monthly investor sentiment data publicly available on his website
at NYU Stern. Assessed on 8 February 2019, <http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/>.
10See supplementary online appendix for details.
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This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, similar to Jiao and Walther
(2016), we discriminate two different types of media, social vs news, and examine the dynamics
in the lead-lag relationships between these two channels from both the activeness (Buzz) and the
emotions (Sentiment) conveyed in data from these two channels. But, in contrast to Jiao and
Walther (2016), we address the important question: had the media landscape changed from 2011
to 2017, and how social and news media had interacted with each other over this period. Secondly,
as pointed out by Baker and Wurgler (2007) and Nooijen and Broda (2016), we emphasise the
importance of time-varying relationship between investor sentiment and the market. That is,
we analyse the mutual causality between media sentiment and stock market variables (return
and volatility) under different market information environments: (i) period of conventional news
media dominance, (ii) transitory period with no clear lead effect of one information channel over
the other, and (iii) period of increasing dominance of social media. Extending the strand of
literature that uses MarketPsych Indices investor sentiment, our exploration and results reveal
new facts about the role of information in asset pricing in the social media era.
3 Data and Methodology
Our dataset is comprised of two sources: sentiment data and stock market data. Our sentiment
data is based on Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices (TRMI) textual analysis scores for the
company group. Our stock market data are obtained from Datastream and Wharton Research
Data Services. Details on each dataset and data pre-processing methods are provided below.
3.1 Sentiment Data
In contrast to the definition in Baker and Wurgler (2006), we refer to investor or market sen-
timent as the overall attitude of investors toward a single security or financial market. It is
the tone of an asset or a market, its crowd psychology. Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices
(TRMI) incorporates analysis of news and social media in real-time by translating the quan-
tity and emotions of financial economic news and internet messages into manageable information
flows.11 TRMI provides three content categories: news, social and combined, based on English
language articles and posts dating back to 1998. TRMI covers more than 2,000 news sources,
including leading professional financial news presses such as The Wall Street Journal, The Finan-
cial Times, and The New York Times, as well as other less influential news content synthesised
by Thomson Reuters News Feed Direct, Factiva News, Yahoo! and Google News. TRMI also
claw and scrape the top 30% of over 2 million blogs, stock message boards and social media sites
minute-by-minute, including StockTwits, Yahoo!Finance, and SeekingAlpha. Term weighting and
scoring approach of TRMI is based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011b) dictionary scheme,
which is proved to be more suitable to financial contexts rather than the psycho-social dictionary
scheme of the Harvard General Inquirer (GI) used in Tetlock (2007). These data allow us to
study and contrast the difference in sentiment effects from social and news media.
11The data are provided by Thomson Reuters Financial and Risk Team as part of TRMI product. TRMI covers a plethora
of securities and markets, including: more than 12,000 companies, 36 commodities and energy subjects, 187 countries, 62
sovereign markets, 45 currencies, and, since 2009, more than 150 cryptocurrencies. For more details, see Thomson Reuters
MarketPsych Indices 2.2 User Guide, 23 March 2016, Document Version 1.0.
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TRMI offers three types of sentiment indicators for a specific company or company group:
1) Emotional indicators including Sentiment, Anger, and Fear ; 2) Fundamental perceptions
such as Long vs Short, Earnings Forecast, and Interest Rate Forecast ; and 3) Buzz metric, a
measure indicative of how much activity market-moving topics, such as Litigation, Mergers, and
Volatility are being generated and discussed. After the social media posts or news articles are
published in the TRMI content sources, a linguistic software abstracts the new content feed,
parses and scores the content and attributes the score to global indices, companies, bonds,
countries, commodities, currencies, and cryptocurrencies. In fact, TRMI offers a total of 35
emotional scores. We decide to focus on Sentiment after performing Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) and checking variance decomposition of the first two principal components.12
However, Buzz metric is conceptually different from the emotional and fundamental scores. It
measures the volume of information flow and, therefore, is not incorporated in the PCA analysis
with other scores. Yet, Buzz metric is crucial in our analysis of social vs traditional news media
dominance throughout the sample period.
Several studies have verified the validity of the textual sentiment measures provided by TRMI
e.g., Michaelides et al. (2015), Sun et al. (2016), Nooijen and Broda (2016), and Michaelides et al.
(2018). In our analysis we employ daily observations from 2011 to 2017 for the MPTRXUS500
company group index that aggregates sentiment and tone of the largest 500 companies in the
US, and aims at capturing the index sentiment. The data are updated each day at 3:30pm
US Eastern time, including weekends and other non-trading days.13 According to Heston and
Sinha (2017), daily textual sentiment possesses short-term return predictability. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for the sentiment indices and the media activity measure, Buzz, based on
social media and news respectively. Sentiment scores are buzz-weighted, averaging any positive
references net of negative references in the last 24 hours. Upon examination of the descriptive
statistics, we observe the following facts: first, Buzz, a sheer media coverage volume metric for
both social and news media, has a much larger absolute value than sentiment (average Buzz
value of 116,484.46 for social media and 202,401.31 for news, while sentiment mean values are
close to zero). Social media Buzz is highly positively skewed with the third moment equals to
1.37, and contains several large outliers.The kurtosis of 6.32 indicates a leptokurtic distribution.
In contrast, news media buzz is more symmetric and contains less outliers than social media,
with skewness equal to -0.01 and kurtosis 3.91 - slightly higher than 3. Lastly, all of the TRMI
indices are significantly autocorrelated with potential long memories.14
3.2 Stock Market Data
The sample period for the stock market data is consistent with the availability of our TRMI data
and sampled daily from January 1, 2011 November 30, 2017. Fortunately, this period avoids the
turmoil of the global financial crisis (GFC) episodes from 2008 to 2010 and escapes potential
influence of change in data sources last reported by TRMI in 2009. At the same time, this sample
period covers a phase of rapid development of social media, allowing us to compare and contrast
12Results of our PCA analysis are detailed in the supplementary online appendix.
13Further details on the TRMI data can be found in the MarketPsych white paper by Peterson (2013).
14In the unreported tables, we conduct Durbin-Watson (DW) test and Ljung-Box test with up to 5 lags (LB-5). Evidence
of autocorrelation with potential long memories for all available social and news emotional indices are available upon request.
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social and news based sentiment directly. Following Antweiler and Frank (2004), and Sprenger
et al. (2014b), we employ stock return and volatility as our main stock market variables, with
descriptive statistics summarised in Table 1:15
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the company group over the period 2011/01/01-2017/11/30.
Sentiment, obtained from TRMI, is bounded on [-1,1]. Negative and positive values denote negative and positive
sentiment, zero denotes neutral score. Buzz, representing the volume of information flow, differs from Sentiment
index, and is only bounded from below at 0. Sentiment and Buzz indices are obtained from TRMI under asset group
code MPTRXUS500 which aggregates information on the top 500 US-based companies and resembles Index. Returns
are calculated as rt = log(Pt/Pt−1), where Pt is the daily close price for the index obtained from Datastream. Reported
return figures are annualized by multiplying the daily return values by 252. VIX data is acquired from WRDS CBOE
volatility index futures closing prices. The unreported Durbin-Watson test and Ljung-Box 5 lags test for all indices
show presence of autocorrelation for all series.
Mean Std Max Min Skew Kurt 25th Median 75th IQR
Social media:
Sentiment -0.020 0.030 0.082 -0.127 -0.32 2.80 -0.040 -0.016 0.001 0.042
Buzz 116,484 35,769 311,543 14,179 1.37 6.32 94,587 110,860 130,317 35,730
News media:
Sentiment -0.017 0.037 0.126 -0.173 -0.29 3.22 -0.042 -0.015 0.009 0.051
Buzz 202,401 47,847 387,635 1,468 -0.01 3.91 172,081 202,994 231,451 59,369
Market:
Return 0.09 1.99 10.42 -15.52 -0.54 8.78 -0.68 0.06 1.07 1.75
VIX 16.34 5.58 48 9.14 2.07 8.34 12.85 14.89 17.96 5.11
We believe that the implied volatility of stock index futures (VIX) is more suitable to our
analysis than the traditional realised volatility measures since investor sentiment is tied to a
forward looking perspective, as defined by Baker and Wurgler (2007). On the contrary, realised
volatility such as standard deviation or squared terms of prior period returns, takes a backward
looking view, and thus is less relevant to our investigation. This is in line with Han and Park
(2013) who compares realised volatility and VIX and proves the appropriateness of VIX for
out-of-sample and forward-looking research.
Our econometric frameworks requires that variables are covariance stationary, with their first
two moments finite and time-invariant. Our results from unit root tests indicate that all variables
are covariance stationary.16
3.3 Data Aggregation Process
In order to familiarise the reader with the properties of our two main TRMI indices, Buzz and
Sentiment, we plot the raw series, autocorrelation functions (ACF) and partial autocorrelation
functions (PACF) up to 40 lags in Appendix Figures A.1 and A.3 (pages 31 and 32). We observe
large outliers and strong weekly seasonality in Buzz series for both social and news media.
Winsorizing Buzz metrics at the 99 percentile (right tail only) mitigates the effects of extreme
outliers.17
To deal with weekly effects in Buzz and Sentiment series, we regress Sentiment and win-
15A full list of all data sources and acronyms is available in Table A.1 in the appendix.
16Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit test results for models with a (i) constant, (ii) drift, and (iii) drift
and time trend are presented in Section A.2 of the appendix.
17We perform asymmetric winsorizing since Buzz, describing media activity quantities, is bounded on [0,∞).
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sorized Buzz on day-of-the-week dummy variables, retaining fitted residuals as our seasonally
adjusted data. Figure A.2 in the appendix plots the winsorized and seasonality adjusted Buzz
series. Lastly, we align seasonality adjusted TRMI indices with market variables for trading days
only. The values for sentiment indices during non-trading days are averaged with the sentiment
index value on the first trading day immediately after a weekend or public holiday. For example,
sentiment indices on Monday represent average values based on Saturday, Sunday and Monday
sentiment scores. Figure A.4 in the appendix depicts the seasonality adjusted and non-trading
day merged Sentiment series. After combining with stock market data, our sample size reduces
from 2,526 observations to 1,803 for each time-series. A comparison of Figures A.2 and A.4
shows that we have successfully removed the weekly seasonality from both the buzz and sen-
timent series. This concludes our data pre-processing, with both series, Buzz and Sentiment,
exhibiting stationary, strong autocorrelation and long memory, allowing us to pinpoint the best
econometric framework for this type of series.
3.4 Econometric Framework
To capture interdependence between news and social media while avoiding explicit exogeneity
assumptions, we adopt the vector autoregressive (VAR) framework.18 VAR provides a simple
framework systematically capturing rich dynamics in multiple time-series. We rely on a rolling-
window VAR approach to investigate our main research questions, respectively: (1) How social
and news media interact with each other over time? (2) What are the dynamic relationships
between media activities and stock market activities?
To identify a group of simultaneous equation models, one has to make assumptions about
endogeneity of the variables considered: which variables are deemed endogenous while others are
purely exogenous? These decisions are often criticized as being too subjective (Gujarati, 2009).
VAR overcome this shortcoming since it does not assign any prior distinction between endogenous
and exogenous variables, i.e. all variables in VAR are endogenous. Thus, to investigate how
social and news media activeness (Buzz ) and emotions (Sentiment) intertwine with each other
over time, and further to probe how media sentiment and stock market associate with each other,
we adopt a general VAR framework setup shown as follow:19
General Setup: Let xt be a multivariate time series, a VAR process of order 1, or VAR(1) for
short, follows the model: xt = φ0 + Φ · xt−1 + εt
where φ0 is a k-dimensional vector, Φ is a k × k matrix, and {εt} is a sequence of serially
uncorrelated random vectors with mean zero and covariance matrix Ω.20 For instance, xt could
consist of any number of the following variables:
• market data (e.g., return, volume, and/or volatility);
• TRMI social indices (e.g., buzz, sentiment and/or fear);
• TRMI news indices (e.g., buzz, sentiment, gloom, etc. );
18Sims (1980) advocated VAR models as providing a theory-free method to estimate linear interdependence among time-
series and to avoid the “incredible identification restrictions”.
19A full list of variables, the notations and definitions of them used in this study is available in Table A.1.
20{εt} is also called impulse, or innovations (Tsay, 2005).
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xt can be generalized to VAR(p), where p is the number of lags considered. To choose the
appropriate lag length, p, we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz’s Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC).21 BIC generally penalizes free parameters more strongly than AIC,
allowing for more parsimonious models.22
4 News vs Social Media: Dominating Causality Pattern
We investigate the question: how financial news media landscape changed in the past decade
by examining the dynamic relations between BuzzS and BuzzN from estimating a VAR(1)
model using S&P500 TRMI company group data. Buzz metric is conceptually different from
the emotional and fundamental scores.23 It measures the volume of information flow and, in
fact, is used in calculating the emotional and fundamental scores. We choose it because it is
the most representative stock index in the US market, comprising of the most liquid large-cap
companies representing approximately 80% of the US equity market capitalization. By restricting
the analysis to the S&P500 group, we ensure that the companies in our aggregate sample are
sufficiently large to receive regular media coverage. To help with the interpretation of the results,
we rewrite the general VAR model in scalar form, where we set k = 2,xt = (BuzzS , BuzzN )′:
BuzzS,t = φS,0 + Φ1,1BuzzS,t−1 + Φ1,2BuzzN,t−1 + ε1,t, (1)
BuzzN,t = φN,0 + Φ2,1BuzzS,t−1 + Φ2,2BuzzN,t−1 + ε2,t.
Here, Φ1,2 denotes the linear dependence of BuzzS,t on BuzzN,t−1 with lagged dependent variable
BuzzS,t−1 also as a regressor, so Φ1,2 captures the conditional effect of BuzzN,t−1 to BuzzS,t
given BuzzS,t−1. Analogous interpretation for Φ2,1 applies. Gujarati (2009) distinguishes four
cases for such VAR system:
1. Unidirectional causality from BuzzN to BuzzS if Φ1,2 is significantly different from zero
while Φ2,1 is NOT significantly different from zero;
2. Inverse unidirectional causality from BuzzS to BuzzN if Φ2,1 is significantly different from
zero while Φ1,2 is NOT significantly different from zero;
3. Feedback, or bilateral causality, when both Φ1,2 and Φ2,1 are significantly different from
zero;
4. Independence, when neither Φ1,2 nor Φ2,1 are significantly different from zero.
Our interest lies in the off-diagonal regression coefficients because the level and significance
of VAR off-diagonal coefficients characterize causal relationships, while diagonal elements only
show autocorrelation effects.
To perform a rolling-window analysis, we use the past 365 days (i.e. the prior one-year
period) as an estimation window. We obtain off-diagonal elements of slope coefficients (Φ12
and Φ21) and test their significance. We repeat this analysis on each day for the reminder of
the sample to capture the dynamics and evolution of the causal relationship over time. Figure
1 presents the results of this procedure. Each vertical pair of observations represents the off-
diagonal slope coefficients of a VAR(1) model. Statistically significant results are emphasised
21For notation and definition details, refer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
22We conduct formal hypothesis test using the likelihood ratio statistic. Our results are reported in Section B.2.3.
23See supplementary online appendix for details on these definitions in Section B.3.
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with bold points.24 Following DeMiguel et al. (2014), we define “dominating” or “leading” series
as follow: in an off-diagonal coefficients plot of a two-variable rolling-horizon VAR system, if one
coefficient is significant, the other coefficient is insignificant, then the significant series “leads” or
“dominates” the insignificant series. If both coefficients are significant, then the higher magnitude
coefficient “leads” or “dominates” the lower magnitudes series.
Figure 1: Rolling Window VAR(1) Off-Diagonal Elements - daily Buzz. This plot depicts
the inter-relationships between BuzzS and BuzzN series from 2011/01/01 to 2017/11/30. Sample contains 2,526
observations for each series, with the first 365 observations used as pre-estimation window. The red line represents
the leading effect from news media to social media, Φ12 in equation system (1), and the blue line indicates the
leading effect from social media to news, Φ21 in equation system (1). Coefficients that are significant at the 90%
level are shown with bold dots. The shaded area indicates a transition period. We rely on the crossings of the two
lines: estimated effect of previous BuzzS on current BuzzN (blue line) and estimated effect of previous BuzzN
on current BuzzS (red line). In the beginning of our sample, as we roll the estimation window, the two lines
converge. Towards the end of our sample, the two lines begin to diverge. We used the first and the last crossing
points as the dates for the beginning and the end of the transition period, respectively.
From Figure 1, we observe that the blue and red coefficients crossed in October 2013. Prior
to this “transition” point, the magnitude of red line (Φ12) is above blue line (Φ21), with more
numbers of Φ12 coefficients being significant than the Φ21 coefficients. For example, in Table 2
Panel A left side, we report one of the VAR(1) results based on equation (1) in the pre-transition
period. φ12, the impact from BuzzN to BuzzS , is 0.1927 and significant at 1% level. By con-
trast, φ21, the impact from BuzzS to BuzzN , is -0.0329 and not statistically significant. This
phenomenon reveals the fact that news media activity dominates social media activities before
October 2013. After this “flip-point”, we observe that the values of blue coefficients exceed the
red coefficients. From 2014 to 2016, there are periods that both blue and red coefficients are sig-
nificant, indicating news and social media mutually Granger cause each other. We interpret this
24Based on our analysis, a VAR model with 7 lags is optimal according to BIC criterion. Detailed AIC and BIC results are
available in our supplementary appendix (Table B.2 Panel A on page 35). However, we report VAR(1) as it is a parsimonious
form of VAR(7) based on the model specification test shown in Table B.3 on page 36 of the appendix. According to Table
B.3, most of the intermediate lags’ coefficients in VAR(7) model are insignificant, and only the coefficients of the seventh-lag
and the coefficients of the first lag are significant, suggesting that the optimal lags determined by the information criteria
might be due to the remaining weekly seasonality, which could not be modelled. Similar rolling window VAR(1) approach
was used in DeMiguel et al. (2014) in investigating the cross-correlations between size portfolios over time. The results of
our VAR(7) model are available upon request.
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period as a transition period (the grey shaded period). We find that the “flip-point” date identi-
fied from our data coincidences with the SEC’s permission to new format media announcements
as mentioned in Section 1. Lastly, we find that after mid-2016, Φ21 (the blue line, social to news)
trends further upward, remaining significant, while Φ12 (the red line, news to social) fluctuates
and tend to trend downward, indicating a prominent influence of social media on conventional
news. Meanwhile, as shown in the right side of Panel A Table 2, φ21, the coefficient from BuzzS
to BuzzN , equals to 0.1101 and is significant at 1% level, while a lower level φ12, the coefficient
from BuzzN to BuzzS , is not statistically significant. This result confirms the dominant effect
of social media over news after January 2016. Overall, our results shows that there has been
a change in the information landscape and market conditions with the distinct propagation of
social media is playing a predominant role in the flow of information.
Table 2: Before vs After Transition Period VAR Slope Coefficients: Social vs
News. Panels A and B report the estimated VAR(1) slope coefficients for system equations (1) and (2)
respectively. p-values below 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are denoted as *, **, and *** respectively. In Panel A, φ12
represents the effects from news media volume to social media activeness, while φ21 shows the impacts from
social media activity to news article volume. φ11 and φ22 in Panel A are the autocorrelations for BuzzS
and BuzzN respectively. In Panel B, φ12 and φ21 coefficients represent the effects from net sentiment on
news media to social media based sentiment, while φ21 shows the impacts from social media sentiment to
news-based sentiment. φ11 and φ22 in Panel B are the autocorrelations for sentS and SentN respectively.
Panel A: BuzzS vs BuzzN
Pre-transition Period Post-transition Period
Coef. s.e. t-stat p-value Coef. s.e. t-stat p-value
φ11 0.8719 0.0418 20.86*** 0.00*** φ11 0.5199 0.0684 7.60*** 0.00***
φ12 0.1927 0.0388 4.96*** 0.00*** φ12 0.0416 0.0998 0.42 0.68
φ21 -0.0329 0.0547 -0.60 0.55 φ21 0.1101 0.0435 2.53*** 0.01***
φ22 0.5577 0.0508 10.97*** 0.00*** φ22 0.7021 0.0634 11.07*** 0.00***
Panel B: SentS vs SentN
Pre-transition Period Post-transition Period
Coef. s.e. t-stat p-value Coef. s.e. t-stat p-value
φ11 0.6421 0.0465 13.81*** 0.00*** φ11 0.6807 0.0435 15.65*** 0.00***
φ12 0.2325 0.0601 3.87*** 0.00*** φ12 0.0166 0.0481 0.34 0.73
φ21 -0.0089 0.0390 -0.23 0.82 φ21 -0.1589 0.0470 -3.38*** 0.00***
φ22 0.4503 0.0504 8.94*** 0.00*** φ22 0.3907 0.0520 7.51*** 0.00***
Next, we examine how the emotions expressed in news and social media intertwine with each
other across time. Following the same methodology, we represent k = 2,xt = (SentS , SentN )′
in the General Setup of VAR(1)25 In Figure 2, we observe a sharp difference in the magnitudes
of VAR coefficients (between Φ12 and Φ21) prior to the shaded transition period. Specifically,
the one-day lead effect from news sentiment to social (red, Φ12) is significantly higher than the
effect from social sentiment to news (blue, Φ21). For example, in the left side of Panel B in Table
2, one of the VAR regression results in the “Pre-transition Period” shows that the coefficient
of news to social sentiment effect (φ12) is 0.2325 with t-statistics and p-value significant at 1%
level. In contrast, the coefficient of social to news sentiment effect (φ21) is -0.0089, a much lower
level compared with φ12, 0.2325, with insignificant p-value (0.82). Continuing our investigation
25Table B.3 Panel B in the Appendix provides evidence substantiating that VAR(1) is a parsimonious model of VAR(7)
by listing coefficient estimates for intermediate lags and their significance levels, and rewrite the model as equation system
(2):
SentS,t = φS,0 + Φ1,1SentS,t−1 + Φ1,2SentN,t−1 + ε1,t (2)
SentN,t = φN,0 + Φ2,1SentS,t−1 + Φ2,2SentN,t−1 + ε2,t
The rolling-window results from equation system (2) are plotted in Figure 2.
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of Figure 2, we find that, in spite of some fluctuations in the transition period when news and
social mutually influence each other, the impact of social media sentiment effect dominates in
the final part of our sample period, which is similar to the buzz analysis pattern. We also observe
that most of the red (Φ12) coefficients are not significant in this post-transition episodes, while
more blue (Φ21) coefficients are significant and at higher magnitudes. For instance, the right side
of Panel B in Table 2 indicates that one of the “Post-transition Period” VAR has social to news
effect (φ21) of -0.1589, which is significant at 1% level. But influences from news to social media
sentiment (φ12) become insignificant (p-value of 0.73) at a lower level of 0.0166. This result is
consistent with the pattern we identified in Figure 1. In both figures, news media impacts are
leading social media effects before the transition period, however, after the transition period,
this pattern is reversed.
Figure 2: Rolling Window VAR(1) Off-Diagonal Elements - daily Sentiment . This plot
depicts the inter-relationships between SentS and SentN series from 2011/01/01 to 2017/11/30. Sample contains
2,526 observations for each series, with the first 365 observations used as pre-estimation window. The shaded
area indicates a transition period. The red line represents the leading effect from news media to social media, Φ12
in equation system (2), and the blue line indicates the leading effect from social to news, Φ21 in equation system
(2). Coefficients that are significant at the 90% level are shown with bold dots.
5 Media vs Market: Sub-sampling Period Comparison
Now that we have established that there is a transition period, we turn our attention to the
question of how sentiment impacts on the stock market during the two periods: the pre-2014
and post-2016 sessions. Accordingly, we merge and synchronise the seasonality adjusted social
and news Sentiment series with stock variables by averaging Sentiment values on non-trading
days. Next, to deal with the scale difference problem, we standardise all series to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation prior to estimation. As identified in the previous section, we
separate our sample period into three sub-periods: the pre-transition period (from Jan 2011 to
Dec 2013), the transition period (from Jan 2014 to Dec 2015), and the post-transition period
(from Jan 2016 to Nov 2017).
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5.1 Sentiment vs Return
To examine the relationship between returns and sentiment, we estimate the following two sys-
tems by replacing k = 2, x = (SentS , r)′ and x = (SentN , r)′ respectively in the General Setup
of VAR(1):
SentS,t = φS,0 + Φ1,1SentS,t−1 + Φ1,2rt−1 + ε1,t (3)
rt = φN,0 + Φ2,1SentS,t−1 + Φ2,2rt−1 + ε2,t
SentN,t = φS,0 + Φ1,1SentN,t−1 + Φ1,2rt−1 + ε1,t (4)
rt = φN,0 + Φ2,1SentN,t−1 + Φ2,2rt−1 + ε2,t
This VAR setup allows us to account for the mutual impacts between return and media sentiment.
We focus on the pre-2014 and after-2016 episodes, omitting the transition period because the
dominating pattern during the transition period is less obvious.26.
Panels A and B in Table 3 summarise the results for VAR systems in (3) and (4) respectively
over pre- and post-transition periods. The coefficients estimated are the initial sensitivities of
the dependent variable to lagged independent variables. For example, φ12 from both pre- and
post-transition periods in Panels A and B are positive and significant at 5% level: 0.0995 in the
pre-transition period, and 0.1929 in the post-transition period for the social media sentiment VAR
system in Panel A; 0.1060 in the pre-transition period and 0.2171 in the post-transition period for
the news sentiment regression in Panel B. These results indicate that returns have positive and
significant impacts on both social and news sentiment. In contrast, initial sensitivities of returns
to sentiment, the φ21 coefficients in Panels A and B, are insignificant for all four estimators.
This result is consistent with the extant literature. For example, Sprenger et al. (2014a) also
finds that the feedback effect from stock market to social media variables prevails. To get a
better understanding of these results, and to contrast news and social media effects, we generate
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for the leading 20 working days (equivalent to approximately
one month) in Figure 3.
Plots on the left of Figure 3 represent IRFs that capture return responses to social or news
media sentiment shocks. Panels (a) and (c) represent responses of return to social meida senti-
ment shocks in the pre- and post-transition period respectively, whereas Panels (e) and (g) are
return responses to news sentiment shocks in the two sub-sampling periods respectively. All
four left-hand side IRFs show that the initial impacts on return from sentiment (both social
and news) are positive, and reverting back to zero gradually with deviations at different speeds.
This finding is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, which proposes that sudden surges
in investor sentiment lead to temporarily spikes in stock prices that will retreat shortly.
A comparison of Panels (a) and (c) of Figure 3 reveals two interesting findings. First, the
influence of social media sentiment on return increased after the transition period. In particular,
the magnitude of IRFs expands from 0.03 before 2014 to 0.07 after 2016 - the sensitivity almost
26As is shown in Table B.2 in the Appendix, VAR(5) is optimal for these two systems according to BIC. However, we
report VAR(1) results in Table 3 due to parsimony of VAR(1) model combined with the fact that intermediate lags, that
is lags 2, 3, and 4, are insignificant. The lag 5 (trading days only data) corresponds to remaining weekly seasonality, which
could not be modelled. This is consistent with our analysis in Section 4, where we analysed sentiment indices and observed
significance at lag 7 (calendar day weekly seasonality)
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Table 3: Before vs After Transition Period VAR Slope Coefficients: Sentiment
Vs Market. Panels A to Panel D report the estimated VAR(1) slope coefficients for equation systems
(3) to (6) respectively. p-values below 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are denoted as *, **, and *** respectively. In Panel
A, φ12 represents the effects from return shocks to social media sentiment, while φ21 shows the impacts from
social media sentiment to return. φ12 and φ21 coefficients in Panel B represent the same lead-lag relations
as shown in Panel A, but for news-based sentiment. φ11 and φ22 are the autocorrelation for Sentiment and
Return in Panels A and B. Likewise, in Panel C, φ12 represents the effects from volatility (VIX) to social
media sentiment, while φ21 shows the impacts from social media sentiment to stock volatility. φ12 and
φ21 coefficients in Panel D represent the same lead-lag relations as shown in Panel C, but for news-based
sentiment. Sentiment is measured as the squared term of the seasonality adjusted and non-trading day
averaged Sentiment series in Panels C and D, and φ11 and φ22 are the autocorrelation for Sent2 and V IX
in these two panels.
Panel A: SentS vs Return
Pre-transition Period Post-transition Period
Coef. s.e. t-stat p-value Coef. s.e. t-stat p-value
φ11 0.3957 0.0581 6.81*** 0.00*** φ11 0.6041 0.0503 12.02*** 0.00***
φ12 0.0995 0.0455 2.19** 0.03** φ12 0.1929 0.1040 1.85* 0.06*
φ21 -0.0345 0.0807 -0.43 0.67 φ21 -0.0130 0.0301 -0.43 0.67
φ22 -0.0925 0.0632 -1.46 0.14 φ22 -0.1256 0.0624 -2.01** 0.04**
Panel B: SentN vs Return
Pre-transition Period Post-transition Period
φ11 0.4469 0.0561 7.97*** 0.00*** φ11 0.4007 0.0572 7.00*** 0.00***
φ12 0.1060 0.0567 1.87* 0.06* φ12 0.2171 0.0949 2.29** 0.02**
φ21 0.0849 0.0620 1.37 0.17 φ21 0.0555 0.0374 1.48 0.14
φ22 -0.0896 0.0626 -1.43 0.15 φ22 -0.1257 0.0621 -2.02** 0.04**
Panel C: Sent2S vs Vt
Pre-transition Period Post-transition Period
φ11 0.1520 0.0627 2.43** 0.02** φ11 0.5932 0.0508 11.67*** 0.00***
φ12 -0.0035 0.0677 -0.05 0.96 φ12 -0.0386 0.1827 -0.21 0.83
φ21 0.0270 0.0326 0.83 0.41 φ21 -0.0027 0.0100 -0.27 0.79
φ22 0.8327 0.0353 23.61*** 0.00*** φ22 0.8214 0.0358 22.95*** 0.00***
Panel D: Sent2N vs Vt
Pre-transition Period Post-transition Period
φ11 0.0385 0.0629 0.61 0.54 φ11 0.3080 0.0607 5.07*** 0.00***
φ12 0.1889 0.1256 1.50 0.13 φ12 0.6468 0.2877 2.25** 0.02**
φ21 0.0089 0.0177 0.50 0.62 φ21 0.0135 0.0078 1.74* 0.08*
φ22 0.8287 0.0353 23.50*** 0.00*** φ22 0.8052 0.0368 21.90*** 0.00***
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(a) Pre: rt response to SentS shocks (b) Pre: SentS response to rt shocks
(c) Post: rt response to SentS shocks (d) Post: SentS response to rt shocks
(e) Pre: rt response to SentN shocks (f) Pre: SentN response to rt shocks
(g) Post: rt response to SentN shocks (h) Post: SentN response to rt shocks
Figure 3: Sentiment vs Return Sub-sample Comparison. Panel (a) to (d) are IRFs of xt = (SentS , rt)′;
panel (e) to (h) are IRFs of xt = (SentN , rt)′. “Pre” denotes Pre-transition period: 2011/01/01-2013/12/31; “Post”
denotes Post-transition period: 2016/01/01-2017/11/30. Horizontal axis represent lagged days of IRFs. All time-
series are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. Error bands are constructed at the 68% interval
following Sims and Zha (1999).
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doubled the level after the transition. Second, the speed of revision for the temporary mispricing
induced by social media sentiment has accelerated after 2016, comparing with that before 2014.
In the pre-transition period, return reverts back to its original level in approximately 3 weeks
(15 working days), while in the post-transition period, return shocks dissipate in only 2-3 days.
Interestingly, the pattern of news media is just the opposite. The magnitude of initial impacts
drops down from the pre-transition level of 0.030 (Panel (e)) to 0.016 in the post-transition period
(Panel (g)) - approximately halved in value. Similar to the social media effects, the speed of
reversion from news media influences also expedited in the post-transition period: return reverts
back to its original level in about 8 to 9 working days in the pre-transition period (Panel (e)),
but it only takes approximately 5 working days to revert in the post-transition period (Panel
(g)).
Comparing Panels (a) and (e) in Figure 3, we find that, in the pre-transition period, returns
are more sensitive to news sentiment impact than to social media sentiment. Panel (e) shows
that with respect to a unit of shocks from news sentiment, returns over-correct to a negative
level with a relatively narrower (more statistically significant) error band. In Panel (a), however,
return gradually retreat with a wider error band with respect to shocks from social media senti-
ment. In contrast, a comparison between Panels (c) and (g) reveals that, in the post-transition
period, returns exhibit strikingly higher sensitivity to social media sentiment impact than to
news sentiment, as manifested by the higher initial reaction level (0.07 in Panel (c) vs 0.016 in
Panel (g)) with a much narrower, thus more significant, error band in Panel (c) compared to
Panel (g).
Panels of the IRFs on the right-hand side of Figure 3 indicate the reverse causalities of
each of its respective left-hand side IRFs. All four panels (Panels (b), (d), (f) and (h)) exhibit
similar patterns: a unit of shocks from stock return causes positive and significant increases in
both social media based and news based sentiment the next day (observe spikes at lag 1 in the
IRFs), and the increased sentiment revert back to zero exponentially at different speeds and
in varied magnitudes. Similar to the results of the return responses, we find that the speed
of sentiment reactions has also accelerated in the post-transition period. It takes about 20
working days for social media sentiment to correct itself before 2014 (Panel (b)), while it only
takes approximately 12 working days to correct itself after 2016 (Panel (d)). Responses of news
sentiment expedited, too. A unit of return shocks gives rise to rises in news sentiment that
disappears in about 11 working days in the pre-transition period (Panel (f)), while this effect
dies out in only approximately 7 working days in the post-transition sessions (Panel (h)).
Focusing on the magnitudes of sentiment responses (Panels (b), (d), (f) and (h) in Figure 3),
we observe that both social media and news sentiment become less sensitive to returns at the
post-transition period. For instance, a unit of return shocks results in 0.14 unit of heightened so-
cial media sentiment in the pre-transition period (Panel (b)), but this impact reduces to 0.09 unit
in the post-transition period (Panel (d)). A unit of return shocks brings about 0.13 unit of news
sentiment surges in the pre-transition session (Panel (f)), but this response contracts to a lower
level of 0.065 at the post-transition stage (Panel (h)). It seems to be counter-intuitive to observe
a reduced sensitivity to return in both social media and news sentiment (comparing Panels (b)
with (d), and comparing (f) with (h)), but in fact it is not. One possible explanation to this
phenomenon could be attributed to the scarcity of investor attention nowadays. The abundance
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of communication platforms and information channels facilitates information exchanges among
noise traders, but at the same time, it also dilutes individual tone or sentiment. As a result, a
single opinion would be less influential under the increased information flow, leading to a lowered
level of media sensitivity to stock return. Another feasible explanation for this decreased sensi-
tivity might come from the stricter requirements from the censorship authority and regulatory
bodies, as documented and exemplified in Section 1.
In sum, the findings of interaction between return and sentiment in this subsection validate
and extend the media induced transition pattern identified in Section 4: social media effects
become stronger after 2016, whereas news media plays the predominant role before 2014. For
both return and sentiment series, the speeds of correction in IRFs with regard to unexpected
shocks have accelerated in the post-transition period compared with the pre-transition period,
irrespective of the types of media used in sentiment measure. Relative to the pre-transition
period, the magnitude of return responses to social media sentiment have elevated in the post-
transition period, while such magnitude dwindled with respect to news-based sentiment post-
transition. Albeit stronger than the causal effects from sentiment to returns, feedback effects of
returns on social on news media based sentiment have both depreciated in the post-transition
period compared to the pre-transition levels.
5.2 Sentiment vs Volatility
Applying the same methodology in investigating the return-sentiment effects, we continue to
explore the dynamic relationships between media sentiment and stock volatility at the pre- and
post-transition periods. We estimate the following system equations, by representing k = 2,
x = (Sent2S , V IX)
′ and x = (Sent2N , V IX) respectively into the General Setup.
Sent2S,t = φS,0 + Φ1,1Sent
2
S,t−1 + Φ1,2Vt−1 + ε1,t (5)
Vt = φN,0 + Φ2,1Sent
2
S,t−1 + Φ2,2Vt−1 + ε2,t
Sent2N,t = φS,0 + Φ1,1Sent
2
N,t−1 + Φ1,2Vt−1 + ε1,t (6)
Vt = φN,0 + Φ2,1Sent
2
N,t−1 + Φ2,2Vt−1 + ε2,t
We choose VIX (Vt) as a measure of volatility in the above two systems because investor senti-
ment affects asset prices by shaping investors’ beliefs about the future. In contrast, traditional
realized volatility measures (RV), such as standard deviation or squared term of prior returns,
are backward-looking. Therefore, we believe that an implied, forward-looking volatility measure
is more closely related to investor beliefs and more appropriate to this research. A detailed
comparison between historical volatility and VIX is provided by Han and Park (2013). In or-
der to assess whether VIX is associated with both positive and negative sentiment, we take the
squared term of sentiment (Sent2S and Sent
2
N ) as a measure of the high sentiment period with
strong emotions.27 The benefit of using squared term of sentiment lies in its incorporation of
27The choice of Sent2 is rooted in the fact that the relationship between volatility and sentiment is nonlinear. Only
extreme values of sentiment show relationship with VIX, and both high negative and high positive sentiment resulted in
high VIX values. The transformation is consistent with the choice of absolute value of sentiment, |Sentiment|, in Brown
(1999, p.84, Hypothesis 1) when analysing correlation between sentiment and volatility. Berger and Turtle (2015, p.65,
Eq.1) document quadratic relationship between sentiment and volatility of portfolio returns. Using maximum likelihood
estimation of the Box-Cox power transformation parameter, λ, in a linear model of the form Sentλ = α + β × V IX, we
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the disagreement of opinions expressed in social and news media. Since our sentiment scores are
volume-weighted28 net values of positive and negative emotions conveyed in the parsed texts, the
higher the Sent2, the more likely that the grouped investors are driven by a similar kind of emo-
tion. For example, when Sent2S takes a value close to 1, most investors posting in social media
are extremely optimistic, or are uniformly angry. Therefore, higher values of Sent2 indicate less
disagreement among investors’ opinions. On the other hand, we interpret lower values of Sent2
as containing more disagreement among investors’ opinions, since a lower value of Sent2 might
result from: i) weak emotions expressed in media; and ii) strong positive and negative emotions
expressed at the same time, but these parsed texts’ scores cancelling with each other. We do not
worry about this difference because both case indicate a higher level of disagreement of opinions.
Similar to the return-sentiment mutual impacts analysed in prior subsection, we match TRMI
sentiment data with VIX by averaging the non-trading days’ sentiment indices, and standardise
each variable to contain zero mean and unit standard deviation before importing each series to
the VAR systems.
Panels C and D in Table 3 display the coefficients estimated and their level of significance for
system equations (5) and (6) in the pre- and post-transition periods, respectively. These results
suggest that the autocorrelation effect is more salient than the cross-impacts between sentiment
and volatility. However, these values only indicate the initial responses, which do not help trace
out the dynamics of responses for the dependent variable over time. Therefore, we put more
emphasis on the impulse response functions (IRFs) rather than examining details of the VAR
coefficients.
Left-hand side panels in Figure 4 (Panels (a), (c), (e) and (g)) depict the Impulse Response
Functions (IRFs) of VIX responses to shocks from social media sentiment or news-based sentiment
in both the pre- and post-transition periods. And the responses of media sentiment to shocks
from VIX associated with the corresponding left panels, i.e. the feedback or reverse causality,
are displayed in the right-hand side IRFs (Panels (b), (d), (f), and (h)). The top two panels in
both sides (Panels (a), (b), (c), and (d)) are IRFs of the VIX and social media sentiment VAR
system, while the bottom two panels in both sides (Panels (e), (f), (g) and (h)) are IRFs of the
VIX and news media VAR system.
In both Panel (a) and (c) of Figure 4, we find that the extrema of VIX occur in 4 to 5
working days (about a week) following one unit of unexpected rise in social media sentiment,
in the pre- and post-transition period respectively, and this process gradually corrects itself
toward the original level. Error bands of these two IRFs do not cross zero, suggesting that
volatility (VIX) responses are statistically different from zero over the IRFs forecasting window.
In contrast to return responses (left side IRFs in Figure 3) that all revert back to zero within our
IRFs observation window, the reaction of volatility (left side IRFs in Figure 4) dissipates after at
least 20 working days (about a month), implying a more persistent effect compared to returns.
In addition, we observe that in the pre-transition period, stock volatility is positively related to
heightened social media sentiment (Panel (a)) - strong sentiment generates high VIX, while in
the post-transition period (Panel (c)), volatility is negatively associated with the rising social
confirm our choice to square Sentiment variable at the 95% confidence level. Results are available upon request.
28Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices 2.2 User Guide, 23 March 2016, Document Version 1.0, Chapter 13, page 32:
’all emotional measures are “buzz-weighted” indices.’
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(a) Pre: V IX response to Sent2S shocks (b) Pre: Sent2S response to V IX shocks
(c) Post: V IX response to Sent2S shocks
(d) Post: Sent2S response to V IX
shocks
(e) Pre: V IX response to Sent2N shocks (f) Pre: Sent2N response to V IX shocks
(g) Post: V IX response to Sent2N
shocks
(h) Post: Sent2N response to V IX
shocks
Figure 4: Sentiment2 vs VIX Sub-sample Comparison. Panels (a) to (d) are IRFs of xt = (Sent2S , Vt)′;
Panels (e) to (h) are IRFs of xt = (Sent2N , Vt)′. “Pre” denotes Pre-transition Period: 2011/01/01-2013/12/31;
“Post” denotes Post-transition Period: 2016/01/01-2017/11/30. Horizontal axis represents lagged days of IRFs
(20 days). All time-series are standardized to have 0 mean and variance equal to 1. Error bands are constructed
at the 68% interval following Sims and Zha (1999).
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media sentiment. VIX responses to news sentiment shocks (Panels (e) and (g)), however, exhibit
totally different patterns from that of social media. Comparing Panels (e) and (g), we find that
initial VIX response to news sentiment shocks in the pre- and post-transition periods contain
similar values (about 0.006 to 0.007). Interestingly, in Panel (e), the IRFs coefficients over-correct
in 4 working days, whereas in Panel (g), the IRFs gradually dilute over the observation window.
Consistent with the social media effects shown in Panels (a) and (c), estimated IRFs do not revert
back to zero at the 20 working-day observation window. The broader error bands in Panels (e)
and (g), which cross zero at lagged 1 to 2 days after the shock, indicate that volatility is less
sensitive to news sentiment shocks than to social media sentiment shocks.
A comparison between the magnitudes of all four left-hand side panels with the right-hand side
panels in Figure 4 reflects the fact that feedback effects from VIX to social media or news-based
sentiment are stronger than the causal effects from media sentiment to VIX: the error bands of
all four plots in the right side are significantly different from zero, and they are all narrower:
statistically more significant than their left-hand side counterparts. In the pre-transition period,
the positive IRFs in Panels (b) and (f) show that both social media and news-based sentiment
spike higher following shocks from VIX, meaning the media formulates less disagreement with
strong emotions after VIX surges higher. In the post-transition period, however, the upward
concaved IRFs in Panels (d) and (h) illustrate that sentiment in social and news media with
heightened VIX, regardless of the media type, becomes more neutral or contains more disagree-
ment of opinion: both IFRs plots touch the troughs (approximately -0.07) after approximately 4
working days. In contrast to the fully correction situation in right side IRFs of Figure 3, none of
the four right-hand side figures in Figure 4 displays fully correction after about 20 working days
(one month), suggesting that VIX has a more persistent feedback effect on the media sentiment
than return does.
To summarise the results in this section, although market volatility and media sentiment
mutually cause each other, we find evidence that the feedback effects from market volatility on
media sentiment prevail. This is consistent with Antweiler and Frank (2004), in their analysis of
stock message boards, that stock messages help predict market volatility, however, the reverse
feedback is stronger. Using TRMI data for the Brazilian market, Araújo et al. (2018) finds
similar results, that is the reverse causal effects from VIX to social media or news-based senti-
ment are stronger than the causal effects from media sentiment to volatility. In addition to the
aforementioned studies, we also find that VIX is more sensitive to social media sentiment than
to news-based sentiment in terms of both reaction magnitudes and significance level. Comparing
the pre- and post-transition periods, we observe that before 2014, high VIX level and strong
emotions (or less disagreement) mutually cause each other, irrespective of the media type. After
2016, the heightened VIX is associated with neutral emotions (or more disagreement) for both
social media and news. A comparison across the analysis performed for return in prior subsection
(Figure 3) with analysis for volatility conducted in this subsection (Figure 4) reflects that, the
mutual effects between media sentiment and volatility present a more persistent pattern than
the inter-linkages between sentiment and return.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the dynamic relationships between social and news media activity,
and the impact media has on the financial market. This paper contributes to the literature
in several ways. Firstly, we examine the relationship between two different types of media,
traditional news media and the rapidly growing social media. Our results show that the influence
of news media in terms of generating activity and imparting sentiment have waned in the period
between 2011 and 2017. By 2016, social media had become the dominant information source
in generating media activity and sentiment. Next, we examine whether the rising influence
of social media have permeated through the financial markets by examining the time-varying
relationship between investor sentiment and the market. That is, we analyse causality between
media sentiment and market variables (specifically, return and volatility) under different market
information environments: (i) period of conventional news media dominance at the beginning of
our sample, and (ii) period of increasing dominance of social media at the end of our sample. Our
findings indicate that social media is becoming dominant. This should be of great interests (and
possibly, concern) to regulators as social media is vulnerable to manipulation and misinformation.
We also discover that, generally, market variables exert stronger impact on investor sentiment
than the other way around. That is, the reaction of media sentiment to stock market changes
is more pronounced than the sensitivity of return and volatility to changes in media sentiment.
However, when we contrast the two types of media at the pre- and post-transition periods, we
find that return responses to social media sentiment almost doubled after the transition period,
while the return responses to news-based sentiment almost halved to its pre-transition level. We
observe that volatility in both pre- and post-transition periods display higher sensitivity to social
media sentiment than to news-based sentiment. In addition, we find that the linkage between
volatility and sentiment is much more persistent than that between returns and sentiment. These
results corroborate our prior findings that social media is becoming the dominant media source.
Overall, our exploration and results reveal new facts about the role of information in the social
media era. An interesting extension in future work could focus on individual companies at a
more granular frequencies to assess the timeliness of the two media types.
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A.1 List of acronyms and notation
Table A.1: List of acronyms, data sources and variable names.
Acronym Description
AAII American Association of Individual Investors
ACF Autocorrelation Function
AIC Akaike Information Criterion
BIC Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion
BW Baker & Wurgler sentiment index
BWO The orthoganolized Baker & Wurgler sentiment index
CBOE Chicago Board Options Exchange
CEFD Closed-end fund discount
Datastream Thomson Reuters Datastream
DJIA Dow Jones Industry Average
DJNS Dow Jones Newswires
DW Durbin-Watson test
GFC Global Financial Crisis
GI Harvard General Inquirer Dictionary
GSV Google Search Volume
IQR Interquartile Range
IRF Impulse Response Function
LB Ljung-Box test
MV Market Variables
PACF Partial Autocorrelation Function
PCA Principal Component Analysis
RIC Reuters Identification Code
S&P500 Standard & Poor’s 500 Index
SEC The US Securities and Exchange Commission
SIRCA Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific
VAR Vector Autoregressive Model
TR Thomson Reuters
TRMI Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices
TRNA Thomson Reuters News Analytics
TRNS Thomson Reuters News Scope
TRTH Thomson Reuters Tick History
VAR Vector Autoregressive Model
WRDS Wharton Research Data Services
WSJ The Wall Street Journal
Code/Symbol Description
.SPY RIC for SPDR ETF
Datastream Thomson Reuters Datastream
MPTRXUS500 TRMI company group code approximating S&P500 index constituents
BuzzN,t (N)ews media buzz at time t (report volume in news media)
BuzzS,t (S)ocial media buzz at time t (posting volume in social media)
SentN,t (N)ews media net sentiment at time t (positive minus negative sentiment)
SentS,t (S)ocial media net sentiment at time t (positive minus negative sentiment)
rt log return on day t
Vt VIX (CBOE options volatility index) on day t
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A.2 Testing for Unit Roots
Prior to fitting VAR models, we perform tests for unit root to ensure that all regressors are
covariance stationary. Results in Table A.2 suggest rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root
for all series.
Table A.2: Unit Root Test. The table displays Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root
test statistics for 3 different model variants. ***, **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of unit-root at
1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Critical values at 5% significance level are reported in the last
column.
Return VIX SentS SentN BuzzS BuzzN Crit.Val.
Panel A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
ADF -44.76*** -1.83* -11.12*** -17.11*** -3.02*** -3.03*** -1.94
ADF (with drift) -44.85*** -5.45*** -13.93*** -19.63*** -11.46*** -15.04*** -2.86
ADF (with drift and trend) -44.84*** -6.36*** -17.95*** -19.78*** -12.93*** -15.04*** -3.41
Panel B: Phillips-Perron (PP) test
PP -29.47*** -1.74* -8.88*** -13.41*** -2.76*** -2.85*** -1.94
PP (with drift) -29.56*** -5.16*** -10.92*** -15.36*** -10.28*** -14.17*** -2.86
PP (with drift and trend) -29.56*** -6.03*** -13.82*** -15.47*** -11.61*** -14.17*** -3.41
30
A.3 ACF and PACF for main TRMI series
Figure A.1: Time-series Analysis of raw Buzz data. The left three panels show the sample distri-
bution of the original social media posts volume measure: Buzz, as well as its autocorrelation function (ACF)
and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) up to 40 days. The three panels on the right represent news-based
Buzz series distribution, its ACF and PACF respectively. Sampling period: 2011/01/01-2017/11/30. The top
two figures (blue series) verify descriptive statistics reported in Table 1, and highlight the fact that the original
Buzz series contain several observations at the right tail (large outliers). Social (left) Buzz tends to be more
volatile than news (right) counterpart. Both ACF and PACF indicate the presence of strong weekly seasonality
for both BuzzS abd BuzzN
Figure A.2: Winsorized and De-Seasoned Buzz Time Series Check. The left three panels
show the sample distribution of BuzzS after truncating the large value observations (asymmetric winsorizing
the right tail outliers), its autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) up to 40
days. The right side three panels represent the winsorized and seasonality adjusted news-based Buzz, its ACF
and PACF respectively. Sampling period: 2011/01/01-2017/11/30. Comparing with Figure A.1, the ACFs and
PACFs of these two series indicate a diminished, yet not fully eliminated weekly seasonality. Since this research
does not involve the association between Buzz and stock returns/volatility, the non-trading day adjusted Buzz
distributions are not reported for brevity.
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Figure A.3: Raw Sentiment Time Series Check. The left three panels show the sample distribution
of the net positive and negative emotion scores from social media: SentS , as well as its autocorrelation function
(ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) up to 40 days. The right side three panels represent news-
based Sentiment series distribution, its ACF and PACF respectively. Sampling period: 2011/01/01-2017/11/30.
The top two figures (blue series) illustrate that the original Sentiment series are normalised to zero mean,
consistent with descriptive statistics from Table 1. Social (left) Sentiment exposes more negative observations
than news-based (right) scores. Both ACF and PACF indicate the existence of weekly seasonality, and this
property is more obvious in news-based sentiment scores.
Figure A.4: De-Seasoned and Market Merged Sentiment Time Series Check. The left three
panels show the sample distribution of the seasonality adjusted and non-trading day averaged value of SentS ,
as well as its autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) up to 40 days. The
right side three panels represent news-based Sentiment series distribution after dealing with the weekly effects
and merging with the trading-day only market variables. Its ACF and PACF are presented below respectively.
Sampling period: 2011/01/01-2017/11/30. Since Sentiment are volume (Buzz) weighted and normalised, we do
not winsorize Sentiment series. This research concentrates on the inter-relations between Sentiment and stock
variables, we match the Sentiment scores with market variables by averaging the non-trading day values. Both
ACF and PACF indicate that the weekly seasonality is properly tackled with after these procedures.
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B Supplementary Online Appendix
B.1 Tried-and-true vs Bold-and-New: on commonality between Baker &
Wurgler and MarketPsych Indices
Recently launched Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices (TRMI) contain synthesized quantities and
emotional measures from a wide range of traditional news channels as well as social media platforms. We
contrast sentiment captured by TRMI from social and news media to the “tried-and-true” Baker &Wurgler
index (BW) commonly used in investor sentiment analysis in the past decade. To do this, we aggregate
the daily TRMI social media and news sentiment scores (denoted as SentS and SentN respectively) into
monthly frequency and report the correlations between TRMI and the BW sentiment indices in Table B.1.
The results in Table B.1 demonstrate commonalities between TRMI sentiment indicators and the BW
index, yet, the magnitude of correlation coefficients are indicative of divergence of these two measures.
This suggests that the TRMI sentiment indices capture different investor sentiment from BW’s. Thus,
on one hand, strong positive correlation provides merit for using TRMI as it captures commonality in
general trend of these two indicators. On the other hand, TRMI provides sentiment scores at a much
higher frequencies allowing us to study the dynamics in temporal displacement within sentiment scores
(news vs social) and between sentiment and market variables (sentiment vs returns and/or volatility).
Table B.1: Correlation Between BW and TRMI
Sentiment Indices. Sample period Jan/2011-Sep/2015.
TRMI daily sentiment indices are aggregated into monthly fre-
quency to match the BW index. BW sentiment data are ob-
tained from personal website of Jeffrey Wurgler at NYU Stern.
BW and BWO denote the investor sentiment from equation
(2) and the orthogonalized sentiment index from equation (3)
of Baker and Wurgler (2006) respectively. ***, **, and * in-
dicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
SentS SentN BW BWO
SentS 1.000
SentN 0.784*** 1.000
BW 0.543*** 0.440*** 1.000
BWO -0.358*** -0.318** 0.339*** 1.000
B.2 Robustness check: model selection
Model selection is an integral part of the statistical analysis of VAR models. For VAR models, model
selection consists of two parts:
1. determining the lag order, and
2. determining the substructures of the VAR model.
Much of the existing literature on VAR model selection focus only on the first part, i.e., the lag order
determination part, presumably because that misspecification of the lag order often has undesirable
implications for subsequent analysis.
When the selected lag order is underfitted, there can be significant residual autocorrelations. Simu-
lations of Ivanov and Kilian (2005) revealed that lag order selection is practically important for impulse
response analysis. A number of approaches have been proposed for lag order selection, including the infor-
mation criterion based approaches such as AIC (Akaike, 1998), BIC (Schwarz, 1978) and HQC (Hannan
and Quinn, 1979), the hypothesis testing based approaches such as the sequential likelihood ratio test.
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Recently, with the development of penalty-based variable selection techniques such as the Lasso (Tib-
shirani, 1996) and the adaptive Lasso (Zou, 2006), researchers have begun to consider both parts of VAR
model selection simultaneously. Hsu et al. (2008) applied the idea of the Lasso to VAR models to select the
lag order and determine the substructures of the coefficient matrices all together. Ren and Zhang (2010)
proposed a model selection method using the adaptive Lasso. Although most of the above-mentioned
methods have solid theoretical justifications, simulation study results are mixed and usually conflicting,
and a universally acceptable method is still unavailable.
In what follows, we present our results from AIC and BIC estimation in Subsection B.2.1. We
detail and contrast estimates of bivariate VAR(1) and VAR(7) systems and discuss why we prefer a
more parsimonious VAR(1) system in Subsection B.2.2. We perform a formal likelihood ratio test by
sequentially contrasting VAR(p − 1) vs VAR(p) models. We present our most conservative test results
when comparing the most restrictive VAR(1) model to the least restrictive VAR(7) in Subsection B.2.3.
Faced with potential omitted variable bias in our estimation of off-diagonal elements in bivariate VARs,
we check the robustness of these coefficients by estimating VAR systems with expanded set of variables.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.2.2 Optimal Lag Length: Why VAR(1) is Parsimonious Form of VAR (7)
Table B.3: VAR(7) Parsimonious Form Examination (A). Sample A: 2011/01/01-
2011/12/31 (the first year of our sampling period); p-values smaller than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are
denoted as *, **, and *** respectively. Left panel shows VAR model coefficients estimated as
in the General Setup when x = (BuzzS , BuzzN )′ and p = 7; right panel indicates coefficients
estimated when x = (SentS , SentN )′ and p = 7. The p-value columns show that the innner lags’
(lag 2 to lag 6’s) coefficients are insignificant in both models, and most of the significant coefficients
are concentrated on lag 1 and lag 7. This indicates that VAR(1) might be a parsimonious form
representation of VAR(7).
Sample A: First 365 days
VAR(7): BuzzS vs BuzzN VAR(7): SentS vs SentN
Coef. s.e. p-value Coef. s.e. p-value
Constant1 -0.0742 0.0460 0.11 Constant1 -0.2109 0.0724 0.00***
Constant2 -0.2417 0.0694 0.00*** Constant2 0.0884 0.1284 0.49
AR1(1,1) 0.6312 0.0683 0.00*** AR1(1,1) 0.5072 0.0589 0.00***
AR1(2,1) 0.0198 0.1030 0.85 AR1(2,1) 0.2718 0.1044 0.01***
AR1(1,2) -0.0202 0.0452 0.65 AR1(1,2) -0.0283 0.0337 0.40
AR1(2,2) 0.6084 0.0681 0.00*** AR1(2,2) 0.3482 0.0597 0.00***
AR2(1,1) -0.0046 0.0802 0.95 AR2(1,1) -0.0243 0.0648 0.71
AR2(2,1) 0.0954 0.1209 0.43 AR2(2,1) -0.0939 0.1149 0.41
AR2(1,2) -0.0687 0.0525 0.19 AR2(1,2) -0.0028 0.0361 0.94
AR2(2,2) -0.2647 0.0792 0.00*** AR2(2,2) 0.0487 0.0639 0.45
AR3(1,1) 0.0336 0.0803 0.68 AR3(1,1) 0.1230 0.0645 0.06
AR3(2,1) -0.0353 0.1210 0.77 AR3(2,1) -0.0374 0.1143 0.74
AR3(1,2) 0.0228 0.0534 0.67 AR3(1,2) -0.0387 0.0361 0.28
AR3(2,2) 0.0878 0.0806 0.28 AR3(2,2) 0.0748 0.0640 0.24
AR4(1,1) -0.0306 0.0804 0.70 AR4(1,1) 0.0238 0.0650 0.71
AR4(2,1) -0.0955 0.1212 0.43 AR4(2,1) -0.0425 0.1151 0.71
AR4(1,2) -0.0153 0.0535 0.78 AR4(1,2) 0.0245 0.0362 0.50
AR4(2,2) -0.0257 0.0806 0.75 AR4(2,2) 0.0891 0.0642 0.17
AR5(1,1) 0.0810 0.0805 0.31 AR5(1,1) 0.1037 0.0642 0.11
AR5(2,1) 0.1523 0.1213 0.21 AR5(2,1) -0.0070 0.1138 0.95
AR5(1,2) -0.0537 0.0534 0.31 AR5(1,2) 0.0042 0.0361 0.91
AR5(2,2) -0.1052 0.0805 0.19 AR5(2,2) 0.0134 0.0640 0.83
AR6(1,1) 0.0876 0.0812 0.28 AR6(1,1) 0.0558 0.0643 0.38
AR6(2,1) -0.0882 0.1223 0.47 AR6(2,1) 0.0662 0.1139 0.56
AR6(1,2) 0.0189 0.0527 0.72 AR6(1,2) -0.0299 0.0360 0.41
AR6(2,2) 0.2426 0.0795 0.00*** AR6(2,2) -0.0062 0.0638 0.92
AR7(1,1) 0.0142 0.0686 0.84 AR7(1,1) 0.0390 0.0591 0.51
AR7(2,1) -0.1398 0.1034 0.18 AR7(2,1) 0.0783 0.1047 0.45
AR7(1,2) 0.0876 0.0455 0.05** AR7(1,2) 0.0725 0.0334 0.03**
AR7(2,2) 0.2093 0.0686 0.00*** AR7(2,2) 0.0230 0.0592 0.70
[continue table next page]
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Table B.4: VAR(7) Parsimonious Form Examination (B). Sample B: 2016/11/30-
2017/11/30 (the last year of our sampling period); p-values smaller than 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are
denoted as *, **, and *** respectively. Left panel shows VAR model coefficients estimated as
in the General Setup when x = (BuzzS , BuzzN )′ and p = 7; right panel expresses coefficients
estimated when x = (SentS , SentN )′ and p = 7. The results indicate that the inner lags’ (lag
2 to lag 6’s) coefficients are insignificant in both models, and most of the significant coefficients
are concentrated on lag 1 and lag 7. This indicates that VAR(1) might be a parsimonious form
representation of VAR(7).
Sample B: Last 365 days
VAR(7): BuzzS vs BuzzN VAR(7): SentS vs SentN
Coef. s.e. p-value Coef. s.e. p-value
Constant1 -0.1695 0.0451 0.00*** Constant1 -0.0039 0.0959 0.97
Constant2 -0.0429 0.0563 0.45 Constant2 -0.3800 0.0916 0.00***
AR1(1,1) 0.6037 0.0680 0.00*** AR1(1,1) 0.6260 0.0560 0.00***
AR1(2,1) -0.0516 0.0848 0.54 AR1(2,1) 0.1098 0.0535 0.04**
AR1(1,2) 0.0462 0.0549 0.40 AR1(1,2) -0.0809 0.0595 0.17
AR1(2,2) 0.7532 0.0686 0.00*** AR1(2,2) 0.4117 0.0568 0.00***
AR2(1,1) 0.0029 0.0804 0.97 AR2(1,1) 0.0107 0.0654 0.87
AR2(2,1) -0.0422 0.1004 0.67 AR2(2,1) -0.0727 0.0624 0.24
AR2(1,2) -0.1293 0.0675 0.06 AR2(1,2) 0.0049 0.0651 0.94
AR2(2,2) -0.2267 0.0842 0.01*** AR2(2,2) 0.0646 0.0622 0.30
AR3(1,1) -0.0200 0.0802 0.80 AR3(1,1) -0.0844 0.0655 0.20
AR3(2,1) -0.0205 0.1002 0.84 AR3(2,1) 0.0203 0.0625 0.75
AR3(1,2) 0.0768 0.0679 0.26 AR3(1,2) 0.0177 0.0651 0.79
AR3(2,2) 0.1312 0.0848 0.12 AR3(2,2) -0.0547 0.0621 0.38
AR4(1,1) -0.0323 0.0802 0.69 AR4(1,1) 0.0705 0.0653 0.28
AR4(2,1) -0.0059 0.1001 0.95 AR4(2,1) -0.0980 0.0623 0.12
AR4(1,2) -0.0253 0.0681 0.71 AR4(1,2) -0.0206 0.0649 0.75
AR4(2,2) -0.0499 0.0851 0.56 AR4(2,2) 0.0144 0.0620 0.82
AR5(1,1) -0.0071 0.0802 0.93 AR5(1,1) 0.0625 0.0654 0.34
AR5(2,1) 0.0427 0.1002 0.67 AR5(2,1) 0.0984 0.0624 0.12
AR5(1,2) -0.0319 0.0681 0.64 AR5(1,2) -0.0065 0.0648 0.92
AR5(2,2) -0.0019 0.0850 0.98 AR5(2,2) -0.0354 0.0619 0.57
AR6(1,1) 0.1152 0.0802 0.15 AR6(1,1) -0.0596 0.0658 0.36
AR6(2,1) 0.0482 0.1001 0.63 AR6(2,1) -0.0121 0.0628 0.85
AR6(1,2) 0.0334 0.0673 0.62 AR6(1,2) -0.0223 0.0649 0.73
AR6(2,2) 0.1582 0.0840 0.06 AR6(2,2) 0.0382 0.0620 0.54
AR7(1,1) 0.0404 0.0685 0.55 AR7(1,1) 0.2191 0.0568 0.00***
AR7(2,1) 0.0800 0.0855 0.35 AR7(2,1) 0.0262 0.0542 0.63
AR7(1,2) 0.0742 0.0543 0.17 AR7(1,2) -0.0091 0.0596 0.88
AR7(2,2) 0.0512 0.0678 0.45 AR7(2,2) 0.1243 0.0569 0.03**
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B.2.3 Optimal Lag Length: Likelihood Ratio test
Appropriate lag length selection can be critical. In this section, we investigate the appropriateness of our
lag choice. If the number of lags in VAR system is too small, the model is misspecified; if the number of
lags is too large, degrees of freedom are wasted. The likelihood ratio test, which evaluates the statistical
significance of the difference in log-likelihoods at the unrestricted and restricted parameter estimates, is
generally considered to be the most reliable of the three classical tests of model specification (namely,
Likelihood Ratio test, Wald test, and Lagrange Multiplier test).
We reconfirm our selection of VAR(1) over VAR(7) with likelihood ratio test. Our results are presented
in Figure B.1. Our goal is to determine whether bivariate VAR systems, BuzzS and BuzzN (top panel)
and SentS and SentN (bottom panel), containing only one lag are indeed appropriate. The proper test
for this cross-equation restriction is a likelihood ratio test.29 Given the sample size restriction in our
rolling window analysis, we follow recommendations in Sims (1980) and compute the likelihood ratio
statistic as
(T − c) (ln |Σ1| − ln |Σ7|) ,
where T is number of observations, c the number of parameters estimated in each equation of the un-
restricted system, Σn the covariance matrix of residuals from VAR(n) system, and ln |Σn| the natural
logarithm of the determinant of Σn. This statistic has an asymptotic χ2k distribution with degrees of
freedom, k, equal to the number of restrictions in the system.
Using estimation window of 252 days (for consistency with our main analysis), we perform a rolling
window VAR estimation on each day in our sample. The number of estimated VAR systems is 1,546 for
each series set for each lag length. p-values of the likelihood ratio test along time using the equation above
are plotted in Figure B.1. At the beginning, mid-sample, and at the end of our sample period, VAR(1)
systems are appropriate. There are two sub-periods, namely 2013 - 2014 and 2016, where estimation
would have benefited from VAR systems allowing for larger number of lags. Since our objective is to
contrast the earlier period to the later period, our decision in selecting VAR(1) model is justified for both
Buzz and Sentiment series.
29We followed the procedure outlined in Enders (2014, pp.303-305).
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Figure B.1: Likelihood ratio test results The figure displays p-values overtime from the likelihood
ratio test by contrasting the test statistic, (T − c) (ln |Σ1| − ln |Σ7|) to critical values of χ2 distribution.
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B.2.4 Model specification: VAR subsystems and omitted variable bias
As pointed out in Stock and Watson (2001), the VAR shocks, like those in conventional regression, reflect
factors omitted from the model. If these factors are correlated with the included variables, then the VAR
estimates will contain omitted variable bias ensuing undesirable implications for subsequent analysis.
In contrast to Figure 1, where results are depicted for the bivariate system, xt = (BuzzS , BuzzN )′, in
Figure B.2 we present results from the four-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX,BuzzS , BuzzN )′
in the top panel and a six-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX,BuzzS , SentS , BuzzN , SentN )′
in the bottom panel. The pattern in the lead-lag dynamics between social media buzz and news media
buzz is strikingly similar. Even with inclusion of 4 additional variables, the change in estimated coeffi-
cients is minimal. More importantly, the sign and significance of the estimates is still in accordance with
the bivariate VAR(1) system in Figure 1. Given the sample size restrictions and the degrees-of-freedom
constraints, we allude to the simpler bivariate form VAR(1) model as the best fit.
Similarly, to contrast Figure 2, where results are depicted for the bivariate system, xt = (SentS , SentN )′,
in Figure B.3 we present results from the four-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX, SentS , SentN )′
in the top panel and a six-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX,BuzzS , SentS , BuzzN , SentN )′
in the bottom panel. The pattern in the lead-lag dynamics has larger deviations compared to Buzz-
focused systems as discussed in previous paragraph. Nevertheless, similarity among lead-lag patterns in
Figures 2 and B.3 is evident.
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Figure B.2: Rolling Window VAR(1) Off-Diagonal Elements - daily Buzz. This plot depicts
the inter-relationships between BuzzS and BuzzN series from 2011/01/01 to 2017/11/30. In contrast to Figure
1, where results are depicted for the bivariate system, xt = (BuzzS , BuzzN )′, in the current figure we present
results from the four-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX,BuzzS , BuzzN )′ in the top panel and
a six-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX,BuzzS , SentS , BuzzN , SentN )′ in the bottom panel.
Sample contains 2,526 observations for each series, with the first 365 observations used as pre-estimation window.
The shaded area indicates a transition period. The red line represents the leading effect from news media to social
media, and the blue line indicates the leading effect from social media to news. Coefficients that are significant
at the 90% level are shown with bold dots.
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Figure B.3: Rolling Window VAR(1) Off-Diagonal Elements - daily Sentiment. This plot
depicts the inter-relationships between SentS and SentN series from 2011/01/01 to 2017/11/30. In contrast to
Figure 2, where results are depicted for the bivariate system, xt = (SentS , SentN )′, in the current figure we
present results from the four-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX, SentS , SentN )′ in the top panel
and a six-variable VAR(1) system with xt = (Return, V IX, SentS , BuzzS , SentN , BuzzN )′ in the bottom panel.
Sample contains 2,526 observations for each series, with the first 365 observations used as pre-estimation window.
The shaded area indicates a transition period. The red line represents the leading effect from news media to social
media, and the blue line indicates the leading effect from social media to news. Coefficients that are significant
at the 90% level are shown with bold dots.
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B.3 TRMI data and variables
Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices (TRMI) are derived from an unparalleled collection of prime
news, global Internet news coverage, and a broad and reliable range of social media. The TRMI social
media feed consists of both MarketPsych and Moreover social media content. Moreover Technologies’
aggregated social media feed is derived from tens of thousands of social media sites and is incorporated
into the TRMI from 2009 to the present. MarketPsych social media content was downloaded from public
social media sites from 1998 to the present. After the social media posts or news articles are published
in the TRMI content sources, a linguistic software abstracts the new content feed, parses and scores the
content and attributes the score to global indices, companies, bonds, countries, commodities, currencies,
and cryptocurrencies.
TRMI scores are composed of a combination of variables. The absolute values of all TRMI-contributing
variables, for all asset constituents, over the past 24 hours are determined. These absolute values are
then summed for all constituents. This sum is call the “Buzz”.
Thomson Reuters MarketPsych computes 35 emotional scores which are divided into three types of
sentiment indicators for a specific company or company group: 1) Emotional indicators including Anger,
Fear and Joy ; 2) Fundamental perceptions such as Long vs Short, Earnings Forecast, and Interest Rate
Forecast ; and 3)Buzzmetric, a measure indicative of how much market-moving topics, such as Litigation,
Mergers, and Volatility are being generated and discussed.
Thomson Reuters MarketPsych Indices (TRMI) analyse news and social media to convert the volume
and variety of professional news and the internet into manageable information flows. The indicators are
updated every minute for companies, sectors, regions, countries, commodities and energy topics, indices
and currencies. TRMIs are based on relevant text collected over a window of content. If over that window
there was no relevant text identified, then the correct value is “NA”, not zero.30 The indices are marked
as ranging from either -1 to 1 (polarized indices) or 0 to 1 (unidirectional indices). TRMIs are evaluated
on three different content sets: news, social media, and the combined content. History on all content
dates back to the beginning of 1998. Only English-language text is used.
Collection of News media. Reuters news is present in the entire historical news dataset, as are
a host of mainstream news sources collected by MarketPsych Data. During 2005, the archive began
including Internet news content collected by Moreover Technologies. The Moreover content is restricted
to those from top international and business news sources, top regional news sources, and leading industry
sources.
Collection of Social media. The social media collection process is less diverse. It starts in 1998
with content collected by MarketPsych Data. Internet forums and finance-specific tweets compose this
space. Starting in late 2008, Moreover Technologies social media content is included. Using popularity
ranks measured by incoming links, this includes generally the top 30% of blogs, microblogs, and other
social media content. Note that selected Moreover social media is included in the company groups social
media dataset. The company groups data is composed of a subset of finance-specific Moreover content
and the MarketPsych-based social media collection.
Tables B.5 and B.6 present descriptive statistics for the 35 sentiment indices based on social media
and news respectively. We group polarized ([-1,1]) and unidirectional ([0,1]) emotional scores into
Panels (A) and (B) respectively. The media activity measure, Buzz ([0,∞)), is summarised in Panel
30An NA differs in meaning from true zero in that true zero represents the presence of text corresponding to positive and
negative values that add up to zero. In other words, a zero value reflects that relevant text was found and its sentiment
implications net to zero. In contrast, NA represents the absence of any relevant text and of any resultant measurement.
Note that when the Buzz is zero, this means that no values were detected for any of the indices and thus all index values
necessarily will be NA.
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(C). All polarized sentiment scores are buzz-weighted, averaging any positive references net of negative
references in the last 24 hours. Upon examination of the descriptive statistics, we observe the following
facts:
• First, Buzz, a sheer media coverage volume metric for both social and news media, has a much
larger absolute value than other emotional proxies (average Buzz value of 116,484.46 for social
media and 202,401.31 for news, while other emotional scores contains mean value close to zero).
Social media Buzz is highly positively skewed with the third moment equals to 1.37, and contains
several large outliers. The kurtosis of 6.32 indicates a leptokurtic distribution (the last line in Table
B.5). In contrast, news media buzz is more symmetric and contains less outliers than social media,
with skewness equal to -0.01 and kurtosis 3.91 - slightly higher than 3 (the last line in Table B.6).
• Second, we observe fewer missing values among social emotional scores than among news in Panel
(A) and (B), probably resulting from the fact that news reports require more stringent censorship
procedures than social media. Peterson (2016, p.54) argues that “...Professional news sources in-
clude those with third-party editors and a journalistic responsibility to avoid slanderous or libelous
commentary. Editors and fact-checkers ensure not only that news journalists uphold the brand’s
journalistic standards, but also that they do not commit libel or publish inaccurate information.”
• Third, the [-1,1] polarized group scores from social media tend to be more extreme than the news.
Buzz-weighted and normalised around zero mean, the polarized group emotional scores exhibit
close mean and median values. However, the presence of large kurtosis values in the social media
polarized group (Panel (A) of Table B.5) capture the large swings in emotional scores of social
media posts. Similarly, although both social and news media unidirectional group indices suggest
fat tail characteristics, extremely strong words are less frequent in news media than social media
(Panel (B) of Table B.5 and Table B.6).
• Lastly, all of the TRMI indices are significantly autocorrelated with potential long memories. Our
findings are based on Durbin-Watson (DW) test and Ljung-Box test with up to 5 lags (LB-5).
The availability of 35 emotional scores poses a dilemma: which emotional score is the most prominent one?
In order to determine which emotional score(s) we should focus on, we report the within group pairwise
contemporaneous correlations among all available sentiment indices in Figure B.5 on page 49 of the
appendix. To aid interpretation and comparison of a large number of coefficients, we depict correlations
in a schema ball instead of a large correlation table. Panels (a) and (b) depict associations among
social and news indices, respectively. Yellow curves show positive correlations, and purple lines represent
negative correlations. The thickness and brightness indicate the strength of correlation relationship, i.e.
the thicker the curve, the closer the correlation coefficient is to ±1. We find that, among both social
and news based series, sentiment and optimism are strongly positive correlated with marketRisk - a
measure defined by TRMI as “bubble-o-meter”: the speculative extent relative to rationality. We also
notice that gloom and anger embody the strongest negative correlations with sentiment and optimism.
Therefore, we will pay closer attention to the following TRMI indices among the 35 available measures,
namely: buzz, sentiment, optimism, marketRisk, gloom, and anger.
To measure the strength of dependence between social media and news based emotional scores, we
employ Kendall rank correlation. Since emotional indices tend to sway from the normal distribution,
the Pearson correlation is not appropriate. Using 500-day rolling window, Figure B.4 displays estimated
correlation coefficients across time for the six indices mentioned above. Each line in the figure represents
a correlation between an index based on social media and its news-based counterpart. The series are
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positively correlated, indicating that social media and news-based scores are in concordance. The corre-
lations, however, are far from perfect, validating our objective to contrast these two sources of investor
sentiment. In addition, these concordance estimates exhibit strong heterogeneity across time, requiring
analysis over several sub-samples.
Figure B.4: Contemporaneous Correlation Dynamics between Key Social and News
Indices. All six sentiment indices represent company group for the period from 2011/01/01 to 2017/11/30.
Kendall correlation coefficients are calculated using rolling 500-day estimation window. For example, Buzz (blue
line) depicts correlation dynamics between buzz from social media and buzz from news media. The correlation co-
efficients between social and news are positive for all six indices, however, they display time-varying heterogeneity
over the sample period.
Based on these findings, we draw two conclusions that help us select the appropriate model speci-
fication. First, relatively low correlations suggest that social media and news do contain idiosyncratic
components and that emotional scores based on these two types of media could be gainfully exploited
either jointly or contrasted with each other in predictive regressions. Second, the time-varying relation-
ship between social media and news-based indicators suggest that analysis should not be done over the
entire sample period but rather with multiple sub-periods, e.g. a rolling window with a shortened span.
In our quest to explore the lead-lag relationship between social media and news based sentiment, we
further examine lagged cross-correlation (see graphs in Figure B.6 on page 50 of the appendix). Panel
(a) displays the correlations between the previous day social media based indices and current day news
indices, while panel (b) illustrates the correlation between the previous day news-based indices and the
present day social indices. The findings are analogous to contemporaneous case: positively correlated
social and news based series (although with lower magnitudes) and the time varying nature of lagged
dependencies. Overall, Figure B.4 in conjunction with Figure B.6, indicate that the causal relationship
between social and news media indices is dynamic, and causal modeling should be done in sub-samples
rather than over the entire period.
We decide to focus on Sentiment and Buzz among all 35 indices as a result of both the above
analysis and the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). We perform PCA separately on the polarized
and unidirectional index groups (the list of all indices can be found in Tables B.5 or Table B.6). Since
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Buzz metric is conceptually different from other emotional scores, we do not incorporate Buzz in the
PCA analysis. To figure out how many principal components should be considered, we generate scree
plots for social and news groups respectively in Figure B.7. Panels (a) and (b) depict the number of
most influential components for the 18 polarized and 16 unidirectional social media group indices. The
first principal component of polarized social sentiment indices explains 28.32% of total variances, and
the second component explains an additional 10.76% of total variation (Panel (a) of B.7). The “elbow”
appears at the second component, indicating that after the second principal component, incremental
explanatory power of other components is greatly diminished. Likewise, the first principal component
describes 22.19% of total group indices variances, and the second component constitutes an additional
10.71% of total variability. After the second primary component, the remaining components account for
a very small incremental proportion of the variability and are probably unimportant (Panel (b) of B.7).
Panel (c) and (d) illustrate the number of most influential components for TRMI news polarized and
unidirectional emotional scores. For the polarized group ([-1,1]), the first component explains 29.51%
of total variance, and the second component explains additional 12.70% (panel (c)). With respect to
the unidirectional group [0,1], the first component accounts for 20.79% of total variance, and the second
component facilitate to construe extra 11.77% of total variation (panel (d)). We observe that the “elbow”
point also appear at the second component for news groups, indicating that after the second primary
component, incremental explanatory power of other components decreases, thus they are less essential to
our analysis.
Based on the findings above, we abstract the first two principal components and investigate each
variable’s contribution to these two principal components. To determine the most crucial variables
among all TRMI indices available, we create biplots (see Figure B.8 on page 52) to assess the magnitude
and sign of each variable’s contribution to the first two principal components, and how each observation
is represented in terms of those components. The axes in the biplot represent the principal components
and the observed variables are represented as vectors. Figure B.8 in the appendix illustrates the results
for both polarized (left panels) and unidirectional (right panels) sentiment scores based on social media
(top panels) and news (bottom panels). Among the indices in the polarized groups, Sentiment and
emotionV sFact have the highest contribution to variation in both social media and news-based scores
(Panel (a) and (c)). For unidirectional group, violence is the most prominent variable among the news-
based scores (panel (d)), while for social media indices, there is no clear dominant component, instead a
mix of violence, stress, anger, gloom and joy all playing incremental part in contributing to variation
in unidirectional emotions from social media posts (panel (d)). We do not consider violence since we
are focusing on the US market in this paper, although violence could be an important consideration for
textual analysis research that investigates emerging markets or markets domiciled in geo-political and
social unrest regions. Since involving multiple polarized emotional scores will hinder parsimony of our





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.5: Correlation coefficients between various emotional scores for the Com-
pany Group. The two panels are a visual representation of the pairwise contemporaneous correlations between
all 35 scores for the company group (in place of 35-by-35 correlation matrices). Correlations for social media and
news media based scores are highlighted in Panels (a) and (b) respectively. Yellow curves represent positive
correlation coefficients, purple curves indicate negative correlations, the thickness and brightness of curves rep-
resent strength of correlation coefficients: the higher the absolute value of a correlation coefficient, the thicker
and brighter is the curve that represents it. As indicated in Tables B.5 and B.6, there are more missing values
among news-based scores. Concerned with the effect of data sparsity, we excluded a small number of emotional
scores from our calculations. As a result, the number of variables in Panels (a) than (b) differ. Sample period:
01/Jan/2011 to 30/Nov/2017 at daily frequency.
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B.5 One day lag cross correlations between social and news.
(a) Social leads News one day
(b) News leads Social one day
Figure B.6: One Day Lag Cross-Correlation between Key Social and News scores.
Panel (a) shows Kendal correlation between key social and news scores for the Company Group based on daily
data, i.e. the cross-correlation between Socialt and Newst−1; Similarly, Panel (b) shows Kendal correlation
between Newst and Socialt−1. Both figures present similar patterns to Figure B.4 where the correlation between
social and news based indices varies over time, suggesting an approach capable of capturing time-variability in
the dynamics between social and news based emotional scores.
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B.6 Principal Component Analysis
B.6.1 Scree Plots for Social and News Series
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure B.7: Scree Plots from Principal Component Analysis of emotional scores for
the Company Group. Panel (a) and (b) show individual (blue curve) as well as cumulative (red curve)
contributions of each of the components considered based on PCA for the polarized group ([-1,1]) and unidi-
rectional group ([0,1]) for social sentiment indices. For the polarized social sentiment indices (Panel (a)), the
first component explains 28.32% of total variance, and the second component explains an additional 10.76% of
total variation. For the unidirectional social sentiment indices (Panel (b)), the first component explains 22.19%
of total variance, and the second component explains an additional 10.71% of total variation. After the second
primary component, the remaining components account for a small incremental proportion of the variability and
are probably unimportant. Panels (c) and (d) is constructed in a similar manner but based on news sentiment
indices for the [-1,1] and [0,1] groups respectively. For the polarized news media group ([-1,1]), the first component
explains 29.51% total variance, and the second component explains additional 12.70% (Panel (c)). With respect
to the unidirectional news group [0,1], the first component accounts for 20.79% of total variance, and the second
component facilitate to construe extra 11.77% of total variation (Panel (d)). Similar to social groups, after the
second primary component, the remaining principal components account for a very small incremental fraction of
the variability and are probably unimportant.
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B.6.2 Biplots of the first two principal component coefficients
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure B.8: Principal Component Analysis of the Sentiment Indices. Panel (a) is a biplot
of the first two principal components for the [-1,1] sentiment score group in social sentiment indices; Panel (b) is
a biplot of the first two principal components for the [0,1] sentiment score group in the social sentiment indices.
Panels (c) and (d) are biplots constructed in a similar manner but using news sentiment data instead of social
media. Panels (a) and (c) demonstrate that for both social and news media polarized groups ([-1,1]), sentiment
and emotionVsFacts are the most crucial indices based on the variability they are able to explain in the data
represented by the first two principal components. While Panel (d) indicates that violence is the most crucial
emotional score in the news media [0,1] group, this conclusion is less obvious for the social media unidirectional
group (Panel (b)). As violence is more relevant to research that focuses on emerging markets or markets that
domicile in geopolitical unrest regions, we do not consider it in this paper. Since involving multiple polarized
emotional scores will largely complicate the current research, we decide to focus on sentiment and avoid entailing
emotionVsFacts in our models.
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Hightlights:
• Using TRMI data, we discriminate social media from traditional news.
• We find that news media is dominant in earlier period between 2011 and 2013.
• Social media is becoming the dominant media source from 2016.
• Market return and volatility exert stronger impact on investor sentiment than the other
way around.
• Link between volatility and sentiment is more persistent than the relationship between
return and sentiment.
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